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Democracy, Globalization and Financial Crisis. A quantitative essay on the economic sovereignty of nation-states in the Eurozone

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Les llengües de treball son castellà, català, anglès i francès

Esta colección recoge una selección de investigaciones realizadas por estudiantes del Máster Universitario en Integración Europea. Previo a su publicación, los trabajos de investigación han sido tutorizados por profesores con grado doctor de diversas especialidades y han sido evaluados por un un tribunal compuesto por tres docentes distintos del tutor.

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DEMOCRACY, GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS. A QUANTITATIVE ESSAY ON THE ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY OF NATION-STATES IN THE EUROZONE

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ABSTRACT:

During the Eurozone crisis, northern Eurozone countries have been able to maintain nation-state politics and high standards of national democracy. On the contrary, periphery Eurozone countries' national governments have been forced to abdicate part of their nation-state politics through the application of policy formulas with scarce national ownership, which has, in turn, eroded their national democracy. The Economic Sovereignty Index (ESI) proposal, with about 1,000 observations, reinforces recent literature statements on the evolution of national sovereignty in the Eurozone and its negative effects on national democratic quality in periphery countries.

RESUM:

Durant la crisi de l'Eurozona, els països del nord de l'Euro han estat capaços de mantenir la vitalitat de la política de l'Estat-nació i alts estàndards de qualitat democràtica al mateix temps. Ans al contrari que a la perifèria, els governs nacionals s'han vist forçats a abdicar part de la seva política nacional per mitjà de l'aplicació de receptes de política econòmica amb baix consentiment nacional, que han generat erosió en la democràcia nacional. La proposta "Índex de Sobirania Econòmica" (ISE), amb aproximadament 1000 observacions, reforça les recents conclusions de la literatura acadèmica sobre la forta connexió entre sobirania econòmica y erosió democràtica als països de la perifèria.

KEYWORDS: varieties of capitalism, globalization, nation-state, democracy, Economic and Monetary Union, European Union, growth models

PARAULES CLAU: varietats de capitalisme, globalització, Estat-nació, democràcia, Unió Econòmica i Monetària, Unió Europea, models de creixement

Contents

Glossary and symbols

AMECO Annual macro-economic database of the European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs

CAB Current Account Balance

CF Weight of interest on public debt in GDP terms according to AMECO

ECB European Central Bank

EMU Economic and Monetary Union

ESI Economic Sovereignty Index

EU European Union

EZ Eurozone

GVC Global Value Chain importance in trade according to OECD

IST Level of intra-sectoral trade according to Grubel-Lloyd Index with WTO data

JRC Joint Research Centre

OECD The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

WTO World Trade Organization

α Output gap

u Unemployment

π Inflation

μ Weight of an individual variable in a composite indicator

i Nominal long-term interest rate

1. Introduction

There is a deluge of bibliography that addresses the unavoidable tension between national democracy and deep globalization (Rodrik, 2011). Until recently, in the field of economics it was relatively accepted that the European Union was a successful example of transnationalization of state policy, so as to solve part of the tensions of the so-called globalization.

One of the most famous theoretical formulation of these tensions has been developed by Dani Rodrik (2011). According to him, hyper globalization, nation-state and democracy are mutually exclusive, and as a consequence, one of the three factors must be discarded. Hence, there are three possible outcomes in the current global economy: 1) Restricting democracy; 2) Restricting deep globalization; 3) Globalizing democracy.

Such a formulation represents a detailed and lengthful explanation of the link between international agreements and national democratic politics. For instance, Gold Standard was a way of achieving deep globalization, and it proved to be incompatible with democracy. Monetary convertibility from the Bretton Woods agreement, another institutional form of globalization, was proven to be incompatible with the European Reconstruction until 1958 (Neal and Barbezat, 1998: 141-167). In the current era, the Euro Area can be understood as a way of achieving deep globalization while presenting controversy with its democratic impact.

From the Great Recession and the Eurozone Crisis, this debate has been revitalized in the field of the EU and the EMU (Flassbeck and Lapavitsas, 2016; Stiglitz, 2016; Matthijs, 2017; Rodrik, 2017). In line with the Trilemma of Globalization, the EMU – i.e. the European hyper globalization– introduced a trade-off between national sovereignty and democracy among the member states of the Eurozone. As a result, the EMU can be understood as a way of gradually achieving economic, monetary and political union, and, therefore, as a way of gradually globalizing democratic politics at the expense of national politics. Alternatively, the EMU could be interpreted as a way of reducing the importance of citizens' preferences by creating a significant dislocation between the policymaking area (i.e. nation-states) and the economic functioning (i.e. global economy).

Matthias Matthijs (2017) pointed out that the Eurozone crisis gives us evidence to consider that this trade-off between national sovereignty and democracy doesn't work in the EMU and, furthermore, that the interaction of these two variables has different outcomes among EMU countries depending on their growth model (see section 2). Along the same lines, the author acknowledges that, during the crisis, periphery Eurozone countries (i.e. Ireland and southern Europe) have not been obliged to choose between national sovereignty or democracy; instead, they have had to give up both. Antithetically, northern Eurozone countries haven't had the obligation to give up neither of the two options on a practical level (Figure 1). According to this view, deep globalization has not had a significant impact on national politics in northern countries, whereas southern countries have suffered a deterioration during the crisis.

In other words, Matthijs' work could suggest that, during the crisis, the management of the EU framework has provoked outcomes closer to the preferences of the northern national citizens rather than those of the southern national citizens.[1] More specifically, the EU institutions have responded closer to the decisions one would expect northern national institutions to take if the same situation was to be faced without the EMU. Concurrently, in this hypothetical situation, the political outcomes of southern institutions would be divergent with the formula promoted by the EU framework. In this way, the EMU crisis has created national democracies 'with choice' (i.e. northern Eurozone members) and national democracies 'without choice' (i.e. periphery Eurozone members).

Figure 1. Eurozone trilemma according the Matthijs' view



Source: Own elaboration from Matthijs (2017).

[1] "EU framework" is not referred to hypothetical discretional decisions of the European Commission or/and the ECB, but to the incentives that the EU and the EMU create in order to promote internal devaluation and structural reforms, in contrast with other policy receipts performed in the past (e.g. Castells, 2017).

Hence, this characteristic of the EMU crisis has created a divergence in the quality of democracy among Member states. During the Euro crisis northern Eurozone countries have maintained similar levels of institutional quality, while Eurozone peripheral countries have suffered a significant divergence with respect to their northern peers (Figure 2). Matthijs argues that a plausible explanation of this would be the scarce ownership of the policy receipt applied in peripheral Europe (i.e. the crisis of nation-state politics).

Figure 2. Dissatisfied with its national democracy according to the Eurobarometer (1999=100)



Source: Eurobarometer. Own elaboration. Northern EZ are Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Peripherical EZ are Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal.

In short, Matthijs considers that the lack of national economic discretion is connected to the deviation from democratic quality in periphery Eurozone countries. Thus, the aim of this paper is to check quantitatively the two hypotheses raised in Matthijs' work and recent literature on the topic, and in turn, to reduce the lack of quantitative approaches to this matter available in literature (Crum, 2013; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017). First, whether there is a divergence in national autonomy, economic national sovereignty or national economic discretion among periphery Eurozone and northern Eurozone countries. Second, how correlated the national democratic quality and the evolution of national economic sovereignty are, and consequently, how much explanatory power the

lack of national autonomy has regarding the crisis of democratic satisfaction among periphery Eurozone citizens.

To this end, this paper pursuits the proposal of an economic sovereignty composite indicator that will help us to quantify the levels of national economic sovereignty across nations over time. This type of methodologies, oriented to simplify multi-dimensional phenomena, have been promoted by the European Commission in recent years with the creation of the Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and Scoreboards. Furthermore, such methodologies have been used in the field of European Integration Studies in order to calculate, for example, the levels of accomplishment of the Europe 2020 agenda or the degree of development of the Single Market (Tarantola, Saisana and Saltelli, 2002; Hudrliková, 2013).

To sum up, the paper proceeds as follows. The first chapter of the paper analyzes the political economy of the Eurozone. The second chapter of the article projects a definition and a modelling of the economic sovereignty concept according to several assumptions. The third chapter summarizes the processes and methods used to construct a composite indicator. The fourth chapter presents the results of the composite indicator and its connection with dissatisfaction with national democracy. Lastly, at the end of the paper some final remarks on the validity of the two initial hypotheses are shown.

2. Eurozone Crisis and Political Economy response

The creation of EMU by the end of the century had significant implications for policymakers. A non-optimal currency area was created and its effect in compatibility with macroeconomic diversity is still a source of controversy. In the following two sections this will be briefly summarized so as to clarify the implications of a monetary union in economic sovereignty.

a. One currency, different economies

Matthias Matthijs identifies five countries in the Eurozone that, according to his view, did not have a ‘significant level of economic policy discretion’ compared to core Eurozone countries during the crisis (Matthijs, 2017: 268). These countries are the four

Mediterranean countries[2] –Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy– and Ireland. With the exception of the latter, these economies are traditionally oriented to domestic demand and expansionary fiscal policies, as opposed to the continental and Nordic countries, which have traditionally followed competitive disinflationary policies (Hall, 2012: 359).[3]

Prior to the Eurozone creation, these differences in growth regimes co-existed thanks to the mitigation of the inflation deviation by allowing a certain degree of mobility in the nominal exchange rate in order to stabilize real effective exchange rates and external balances among the countries of the Single Market, as we can see in Table 1 (Johnston and Regan, 2016).

Table 1. Average inflation rates and movements in nominal exchange rates (1980-2016)

	Movement of nominal exchange rates (National currency - ECU/EUR). Average				Inflation average			
	1980-1990	1991-2001	2002-2008	2009-2016	1981-1990	1991-2001	2002-2008	2009-2016
Belgium	0.54	-0.44	0.00	0.00	4.58	2.09	2.32	1.56
Germany	-1.80	-0.42	0.00	0.00	NA	2.23	1.74	1.08
Ireland	1.27	0.28	0.00	0.00	7.85	2.75	3.66	-0.09
Greece	13.58	4.97	0.00	0.00	19.04	8.84	3.41	0.74
Spain	3.33	2.38	0.00	0.00	9.36	3.87	3.27	0.96
France	1.59	-0.47	0.00	0.00	6.37	1.80	2.14	1.04
Italy	2.70	2.39	0.00	0.00	9.72	3.64	2.37	1.18
Netherlands	-1.54	-0.42	0.00	0.00	2.47	2.59	1.94	1.46
Austria	-2.12	-0.42	0.00	0.00	3.53	2.35	2.05	1.68
Portugal	9.72	0.96	0.00	0.00	17.31	4.84	2.80	1.01
Finland	-0.75	2.11	0.00	0.00	6.77	1.93	1.66	1.26
Average	2.41	0.99	0.00	0.00	8.70	3.36	2.49	1.08

Source: AMECO and UNCTAD. Own elaboration.

Due to the creation of the EMU –and therefore the abolition of nominal exchange rates–, however, the differences in inflation among different growth models were transformed into external imbalances. Such situation was a key point for the gestation of the Eurozone crisis. As is shown in Figure 3, before the EMU economic crisis, some

[2] Cyprus and Malta are excluded from the analysis due to their significant delay in entering to the EMU.

[3] French and Italian performances are ambiguous, but they will be considered a northern Eurozone country and southern Eurozone country, respectively.

countries traditionally related to demand-driven growth models accumulated higher inflation and negative external balances than its northern peers. These differences were exacerbated in countries with significant economic growth during that period (e.g. Spain, Greece and Ireland).

Figure 3. Inflation and external balance average 1998-2007



Source: AMECO and IMF. Own elaboration.

These structural differences can also be seen if we compare the contribution to GDP growth of exports to the total consumption among countries prior to the crisis (Figure 4). As we can see, Ireland, which is considered a periphery country, had followed its own pattern, albeit it is currently classified as one of the five countries that lack economic discretion due to its macroeconomic performance until 2013 (Brazys and Regan, 2017; Matthijs, 2017: 267).

Figure 4. Contribution to GDP growth of exports vs consumption (1998-2007)



Source: AMECO. Own elaboration

Although we can observe some differences among the so-called 'periphery countries', especially between Ireland and southern Europe, they do show a common pattern of high inflation and a tendency to have trade deficits, which contrasts with the one shown by their northern peers from the Single Market.

In essence, if in the past nominal exchange rates were the mechanism to maintain the existence of diverse growth models in the Single Market, external imbalances were the mechanism to maintain the co-existence of different growth models as soon as exchange rates among EMU members were abolished (Figure 5). Nevertheless, the beginning of the Eurozone crisis broke up the balance of payments' permeability, and put the viability of co-existence among different varieties of capitalism in the EMU at risk.

Figure 5. Current account balances. Northern vs Peripherical Eurozone countries (US Dollars at current prices in millions)



Source: UNCTAD. Own elaboration.

b. Possible policy responses to the crisis and divergences in economic recovery

A key factor in the cross-national political economy comparison is the crisis management. As stated before, for the Eurozone, the recession had considerable elements from a classical balance-of-payments crisis. In other words, the nitty-gritty of the crisis management in periphery countries was how to mitigate the negative externalities of capital outflies and borrowing difficulties in their respective national economies. In this regard, as summarized by Jeffry Frieden and Stefanie Walter, there were three possible policies, not mutually exclusive (Frieden and Walter, 2017).

These three non-exclusive possibilities for countries with deficits were exchanging rate devaluation, implementing fiscal consolidation/structural reforms and/or covering the external gap through financial assistance (Table 2). In the context of the abolishment of nominal exchange rate due to the creation of the Euro, countries with external deficits were forced to reduce those deficits with financial assistance and/or internal adjustments. In the case of northern countries, there were two options within the EMU:

demand-side policies and/or funding deficit countries. The second option was mainly applied.

Table 2. Options for resolving a balance-of-payments imbalances. Jeffry Frieden and Stefanie Walter table.

	External adjustment	**Internal Adjustment**	**Financing**
Deficit country	Exchange-rate devaluation	Austerity and structural reforms	Cover funding gap through external funding
Surplus country	Exchange-rate appreciation	Inflation and reforms aimed at boosting domestic demand	Provide financing for deficit countries with BOP problems
Implication for the Eurozone	Eurozone breakup	Convergence of deficit and surplus countries	Permanent financing structures (e.g., fiscal federalism, automatic stabilizers)

Source: Own elaboration from Frieden and Walter (2017), p. 378.

This reality that affects the geography of the Eurozone –both countries with deficits and countries with surpluses– creates divergent patterns in the EMU recovery. EZ peripheral countries suffer a harsh and sustained GDP contraction (Figure 6), as well as significant cyclical unemployment rates (Figure 7). This contributed to a divergence in the standard of living among EU citizens and in the conception on democratic quality.

Figure 6. Gross domestic product. 2008=100



Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

Figure 7. Cyclical unemployment evolution



Source: OECD. Own elaboration: (Total Unemployment / Total labor force) – Structural unemployment.

The impossibility for periphery Eurozone countries to utilize the tool of external adjustment (i.e. interregional stabilization) lead to national governments not to promote expansionary policies in moments where the risk of excessive inflation was severely low due to a negative output gap (Table 3) (Jahan and Mahmud, 2013). This forced periphery economies to produce goods and services significantly below the full capacity of their economies, as opposed to northern Europe, which only suffered a loss of potential and real GDP during the first moments of the crisis.

Table 3. Accumulated gap between real and potential gross domestic product

	Accumulated output gap			
	1980-1990	1991-2001	2002-2008	2009-2016
Belgium	-7.22	0.15	6.07	-5.47
Germany	NA	8.28	-1.59	-7.79
Ireland	-21.00	6.19	12.96	-15.84
Greece	-2.61	16.30	24.58	-76.67
Spain	-18.45	-4.29	17.88	-45.10
France	-6.68	-8.65	12.04	-11.13
Italy	-3.93	-1.39	9.64	-25.51
Netherlands	-1.32	4.06	-2.79	-18.17
Austria	-2.70	1.68	2.34	-7.53
Portugal	-16.03	15.94	-0.97	-16.59
Finland	6.75	-17.62	7.69	-20.46
Average	-7.32	1.88	7.99	-22.75
Average Northern EZ	-2.23	-2.02	3.96	-11.76
Average EZ Periphery	-12.41	6.55	12.82	-35.94

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

As shown in Table 3, during the period of the Eurozone crisis gestation (2002-2008) the output gap in peripheral Europe was positive and clearly above the northern Eurozone output gap, which is explanatory of the inflation gaps among the north and the south of the Eurozone. Contrarily, during the period of the crisis (2009-2016), we can observe that the output gap is heavily negative for peripheral Europe, as a result of fiscal adjustment and the lack of traditional countercyclical tools that would stimulate a return to the path of full capacity. Hence, the abolition of nominal exchange rates forced the peripheral Eurozone countries to manage the crisis following a policy path that was more oriented towards slow GDP recovery and maintaining membership in a monetary union rather than recovering GDP as soon as possible.

3. Economic sovereignty in open economies

a. Definition and geography of the Eurozone

Formally, sovereignty has been defined as 'the power to govern independently' (Collin, 2004:230). In other words, sovereignty is the ability of setting human devised structures (i.e. institutions) to rule in a particular way in a specific territorial dimension (North, 1990).

The history of nation-states creation shows us that every authority has built up on a legitimacy basis. In the past, this legitimacy was based on the capability of authorities to safeguard property rights or/and guarantee the population's physical security. After the Second World War, in Western Europe the democratic legitimacy basis of nation-states was based on its own capability to safeguard the so-called 'social contract' – understood as the capability of market economies to exercise full employment (Fernández-Pasarin, 2001).

The link between European integration, nation-states, and social contract has been a subject of controversy among scholars. In this regard, part of the literature has defined the European Project as 'the rescue of nation-states', since the first steps of European integration gave room to maneuvers from national governments to fulfill their political obligations of ensuring full-employment. On the contrary, other sources of literature have defined European integration as a phenomenon that irrevocably erode nation-states (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996; Lynch and Guirao, 2012: 54-66).

Thus, what recent literature suggests about European integration in its last phase –the EMU– is that it can have different outcomes regarding welfare among countries and over time. In this respect, at certain times European integration could have increased productivity and growth, and as a consequence given room to some national governments to live up to the expectations of national citizens' standard of living (Fernández and García Perea, 2015). In contrast, the creation of a multi-state area to promote prosperity could create divergences and conflicts of interest among governments that could eventually erode their original nation-state legitimacy basis.

As a result, in this paper I do not measure the degree of sovereignty as the quantity of formal competences that a nation-state has, but rather as the ability of a government to successfully adjust to a legitimacy basis that guarantees a healthy connection with its citizens.

Hence, the definition used in this paper of 'economic policy discretion', 'national economic autonomy', or 'economic sovereignty' is the capability a government has to pursue full-employment oriented policies when these, to the detriment of aversion to inflation, are one of the main concerns of those represented by national governments. Additionally, at the same time, the risk of an inflationary environment is low due to the fact that the position of real GDP is below the potential output –i.e. the output gap is negative– (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2011:739-740).

Considering this, we can observe that, according to available data from the Eurobarometer, unemployment has been higher than inflation in top concerns among all EMU citizens. Furthermore, among northern Eurozone citizens, concerns about unemployment have been stable between the 2005-2008 and the 2009-2016 periods. In contrast, aversion to unemployment has increased dramatically (68.5%) among periphery Eurozone citizens. On the inflation side, concerns on inflation have decreased in both areas (Table 4).

Table 4. To the question: "What do think are the two most important issues facing (country) at the moment?"

	Aversion to unemployment (parts per unit)		Aversion to inflation (parts per unit)	
	2005-2008	2009-2016	2005-2008	2009-2016
Belgium	0.37	0.41	0.30	0.19
Germany	0.55	0.24	0.24	0.25

Ireland	0.13	0.51	0.27	0.15
Greece	0.50	0.56	0.34	0.13
Spain	0.26	0.73	0.17	0.08
France	0.46	0.59	0.30	0.17
Italy	0.30	0.52	0.33	0.18
Netherlands	0.09	0.32	0.10	0.07
Austria	0.39	0.33	0.37	0.26
Portugal	0.55	0.63	0.35	0.24
Finland	0.55	0.63	0.35	0.24
Northern Eurozone	0.40	0.42	0.28	0.20
Eurozone Periphery	0.35	0.59	0.29	0.16

Source: Eurobarometer. Own elaboration.

Moreover, taking the evolution of the output gap and unemployment into account, we can see that during the economic crisis there was a harsh divergence among northern and periphery Eurozone countries (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Evolution of output gap (left) and unemployment (right) in the Eurozone



Source: AMECO.

According to the data shown, during the crisis there was significantly more aversion to unemployment than to inflation, low risk of inflationary environment, especially in peripheral Europe, due to the negative output gap and the significant levels of labor disuse (i.e. high unemployment). As we can see in Figure 2, this equilibrium among output gap, labor disuse and concerns about rising prices in relation to unemployment matches an important erosion of satisfaction with democracy in periphery countries.

b. The Economic Sovereignty Model

Once the economic and political conditions needed for economic autonomy are considered, our model can be defined as the viability of a government to find an economic equilibrium that maintains the lack of democratic legitimacy scarce by modifying the exposure of national economy to world economy, so as to accomplish an output gap and unemployment equilibrium. The degree of exposure is determined by the equilibrium between internal and external balance. Internal balance can be defined as the total goods and services that are produced within national jurisdiction and, therefore, external balance can be defined as the total commodities that are produced outside national jurisdiction but have economic implications for the national economy.

The gap among the optimal balance, the necessary composition of prices and quantities produced nationally in order to ensure a full-employment orientation, and the real balance of a country represents the loss of national autonomy caused by the exposition to world economy. In other words, the relationship between the internal balance and the external balance for less competitive countries is, essentially, reflected in the fact that the external balance competitive pressure shifts the internal balance to suboptimal positions.

This is summarized in Figure 9. In this regard, the ability of a government to promote a set of policies that ensure a balance between the economy (horizontal axis of the scheme) and the institutional equilibrium (vertical axis, stage 2) is understood in terms of its levels of national autonomy. Hence, a non-optimal balance means that dis-embedded economic liberalism is imposed at the expense of embedded economic liberalism, and vice versa (Ruggie, 1998: 62-84).

Stage 2 of the figure is the catalyst between stage 1 and its consequences in stage 3. The symmetry of the figure between balances doesn't mean that an optimal balance ($\alpha \rightarrow 0$ and $u \rightarrow 0$) must be perfectly symmetric. In this respect, several combinations of prices and quantities are possible, depending on the policy strategy and some *a priori* conditions of the economy, although increasing the internal balance hegemony –either with exports or with domestic demand– is imperative to enhance an optimal balance.

If a non-optimal balance is sustained over time, the divergence among domestic institutions (i.e. output-oriented legitimacy) and the partisan composition of

governments (i.e. input-oriented legitimacy) will increase, with the risk of undermining institutional quality (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013:109-110).

Figure 9. Timothy Hellwig "The Global Economy and Domestic Institutions: State of Affairs". Figure adaptation



Source: Own elaboration. From Hellwig (2014), p.7. The symmetry of the diagram does not mean that the balance between the external and internal balance must be equitable.

All things considered, we can summarize the model in four assumptions (A) and two hypotheses (H). The assumptions:

A1. If employment < total active labor force in year t, we can acknowledge the existence of labor disuse in year t. Frictional unemployment is not contemplated.

A2. If the output gap is negative, in *ceteris paribus*, expansionary policies will not create unsustainable inflationary environments.

A3. If the Eurobarometer shows more concerns about unemployment than inflation during the business cycle, we can consider that aversion to unemployment is higher than aversion to inflation.

A4. Taking A1, A2 and A3 into account, if a country has labor disuse, its output gap is negative and those represented by the national government have concerns on unemployment, a nation-state with economic discretion will implement policies oriented to productive expansion – to demand and/or to exports.

The hypotheses:

H1. Considering A4, southern Eurozone countries have less economic discretion than northern Eurozone countries.

H2. The divergent pattern in economic discretion between Core-Periphery is correlated with the divergence in institutional quality among creditor and debtor Eurozone countries during the crisis.

4. Constructing a Composite Indicator: a proposal

a. Methodology

One of the main goals of this paper is capturing the levels of economic autonomy quantitatively. My proposal is based on creating a composite indicator, following the OECD and JRC methodology, to capture the different dimensions of national discretion. Literature points out advantages and disadvantages of using this methodology (OECD and JRC, 2008).

On the one hand, it is useful for its ability to capture multidimensional phenomena with a simple presentation of data over time. This advantage promotes accountability among

the parties involved. On the other hand, during the creation of composite indicators there are some steps that are affected by subjectivity, which can contribute to controversy or misleading policy messages (OECD and JRC, 2008: 13).

With this in mind, the composite indicator designed here is an initial proposal whose goal is to help reduce the current gap in literature on this topic, which could be improved over time. The building process followed below has four steps affected by subjectivity: the individual variables selection, the normalization method selection, the weighing method selection and the aggregation method selection. These weaknesses are mitigated through the introduction of different methods and the observation of the differences among them.

The data is extracted from the Eurostat, AMECO, OECD and WTO. The time base of the composite indicator ranges from 1998 –when the ECB was created– to 2016.

b. Variables

Following the theoretical framework exposed above, in the event of a total output deviation from the potential GDP, there are two ways of expanding the production of goods and services –i.e. increasing the internal balance– of a country. One possibility is to increase the relevance of the public sector through regulations and/or macroeconomic policies oriented to domestic consumption and/or investment. Another possibility is to increase the relevance of exports by making the national production more attractive to foreign purchasers (Hall, 2012: 357-360; Keynes, 1931).

We can elicit the internal balance's dimension through this formula (Mankiw and Rabasco, 2014: 198): $Y = C_d + I_d + G_d + X$. Where $C_d$is the consumption of domestic goods and services, I_d is the investment in domestic goods and services, G_d is the consumption of domestic goods and services by the Public Administration, and X is the total exports of goods and services.

A mirror of a national government's ability to attain an optimal balance when combining a market economy with a democratic legitimacy is the ability of said national government to incentive the spread of the national economy's internal balance while remaining within the framework of open market economies (i.e. embedded economic liberalism).

This is summarized in this paper with five individual variables (Table 5). This proposal for the creation of our composite indicator represents a sample of the main issues that a government must face in order to maintain national autonomy. It has to be able to promote economic *stimuli* so as to shift internal balance to the left (Figure 9, scenario 2); and promote macroeconomic stability at the same time. Variables 'A' and 'E' represent the restrictions that an autonomous government has imposed upon when implementing a *stimuli* policy. D represents the competitiveness of an economy in relation to its main economic partners (i.e. its tendency toward exports) while maintaining the economy's ability to implement an expansionist policy with or without foreign borrowing. 'B' provides information about the potential capability of national economy to substitute imported goods and services for national production in order to instigate the internal production and trade balance equilibrium. 'C' represents the restrictions that a government would have to respect in its export competitiveness given the case of an import reduction in the country.

Subsequently, as previously explained, the *stimuli* in national production promoted by a national government through regulation or macroeconomic policies must be measured in relation to the current position of the balance between the internal and external sectors. As a result, the unemployment indicator will be used as a reference value so as to ponder the need of production *stimuli* policies. Table 5 summarizes the five individual variables mentioned.

Table 5. Composite Indicator. Individual variables proposal

Composite Indicator individual variables proposal					
			Implications		
	Sign	**Formula**	**Stimulus**	**Macroeconomic stability**	**Effect on Yd**
A. Cost of financing the public sector	-1	CF*u	The smaller is CF, the greater is the ability to promote expansionary policies. The smaller is u, the smaller is the need of *stimuli*.	If CF in t is smaller than CF in t-1, it means that the economy in t is more sustainable than in t-1. If u is smaller, the need to pursue countercyclical policies is less important.	Gd, Cd, Id

B. Capability to reduce imports if is necessary	-1	[IST*Imports/Demand] *u	The capability to reduce [IST*Imports/Demand], whether it is through regulation policies or any other means, in case of an increase in unemployment so as to stimulate national production. IST is the average level of intra-industrial trade in a country, according to the Grubel-Lloyd index. The "Roosevelt" variable.	The ability to follow a policy oriented to reduce potential trade imbalances.	Cd, Gd
C. Import content of exports	-1	[(X+M)/GDP*GVC]*u	Different steps of the national production can be organized in different locations (GVC). The aim of this indicator is to introduce the plausible restriction on exports that would imply a scenario of import constraint or reduction.	Measure the viability of an equilibrated trade balance through import restrictions.	X
D. External balance autonomy	1	CAB-u	The national economy's ability to follow a fiscal stimulus path without explicit external support in relation to the need of *stimuli*.		Cd, Id, Gd
E. Incentives to investment	-1	(π-i)-u	The capability to decrease real interest rates in the banking system when needed.		Id

Source: Own elaboration. Variables D, E and A are calculated with data from AMECO. B with data from AMECO and WTO. C with data from OECD and AMECO.

In conclusion, the Economic Sovereignty Index (ESI) can be expressed as follows:

$$ESI = \Big[\big(\mu_A * CF * U * (-1)\big) + \Big(\mu_B * IST * \tfrac{Imports}{Demand} * U * (-1)\Big) + \Big(\mu_C * ICE * \tfrac{X+I}{GDP} * U * (-1)\Big) + (\mu_D * (CAB - U)) + (\mu_E * ((\pi - i) - U))\Big]$$

c. Normalization of data

We are going to follow the methodology of OECD and JRC on composite indicators before any aggregation of individual variables is necessary in order to normalize them. OECD and JRC report suggests nine methods of data transformation. This paper will use the two most common methods: z-score and min-max.

Standardization or z-score transforms the data in a sample using a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Due to the fact that the dependent variable we want to analyze is time-dependent –i.e. the aim of the paper is to analyze national discretion over time–, the standardization will be done following the recommendations of OECD and JRC for these cases. As a consequence, the mean and the standard deviation used will be calculated across countries in t_0 for all time series. Therefore, the formula used is the following:

$$Independent\ variable = \frac{x_t - Mean_{t=0}}{Standard\ deviation_{t=0}}$$

The mix-max method will follow the same time-dependent recommendation as well. Thus, the min-max formula used is:

$$Independent\ variable = \frac{X - Min}{Max - Min}$$

Where 'min' and 'max' are the smallest and the biggest observations in the sample, respectively.

All the results of the normalization process are presented in the Annex 1.

d. Weighing and Aggregating

i. Equal weighs and Principal Component Analysis

According OECD and JRC, there are two ways of weighing composite indicators: with participatory models or with statistical models. In participatory methods, such as budget allocation or the analytic hierarchy process, weights are distributed depending on the criteria of stakeholders or experts involved in the process. In statistical models, such as the principal component analysis or the benefit-of-the-doubt method, weights are assigned depending on the sample analyzed.

For this composite indicator, the Equal Weights (EW) method and the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) will be used. EW is considered a good method because of its simplicity and transparency, but it has a weakness – the risk of double-counting. In other words, we face the possibility that some dimensions of the composite indicator become overrepresented. On the other hand, PCA reduces this risk by balancing weights considering the correlation of the different dimensions in the composite indicator.

The weights of the two methods explained above are summarized in Table 6. Details on the Principal Component Analysis procedure can be found in Annex 2.

Table 6. Weights of the Economic Sovereignty Index

	Cost of financing public expenditures	Intra-sectoral trade	Imports content of exports	Current Account Balance	Incentives to investment
Equal weights	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Principal Component Analysis	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.12	0.18

Source: Own elaboration. Data from Annex 2.

ii. Linear aggregation and ordinal linear aggregation

According to literature on the topic, the main aggregation methods used are the geometrical and linear aggregation methods. For this paper, two different models of linear aggregation will be used in order to compensate variables. First, the classical linear aggregation method, based on the summation of weighed and normalized individual variables:

$Rank\ (ESI) = \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \mu * Variable$ where $\sum_q\ \mu = 1$

The second linear aggregation method is based on the summation of the ordinal position (i.e. ranking) of each individual variable as follows:

$ESI = \sum_{q=1}^{Q} Rank_{\substack{individual \\ variable}}$ where $1 \leq \text{Rank} \leq 11$

The results are available in Annex 3.

e. Robustness analysis

During the generation process of the composite indicator, several methods have been used in order to alleviate criticism on any methodological steps that may be affected by subjectivity. In particular, two methods of normalization, weighing and aggregation have been considered with the purpose of capturing the multi-dimensional phenomena analyzed through different methods. This approach has created 8 different types of Economic Sovereignty Indexes (ESI).

An important step in the methodological process is to see whether these 8 variations of the ESI are significantly different among them or are similar enough. A useful method to calculate this is the average shift in rank.

Table 7. Average shift in Ranking

	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE
Belgium	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.39	0.29	0.29	0.18
Germany	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.39	0.34	0.39	0.50
Ireland	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.61	0.29	0.34	1.03
Greece	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.55	0.39	0.39	1.08
Spain	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.24	0.29	0.50	0.29
France	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.32	0.26	0.16
Italy	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.26	0.21	0.58
Netherlands	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.26	0.16	0.21	0.89
Austria	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.11	0.16
Portugal	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.32	0.42	0.26	0.47
Finland	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.24	0.18	0.55	0.39
EZ-11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.31	0.27	0.32	0.52

Source: Own elaboration. Data from Annex 3.

The average shift in rank (Table 7) indicates the deviation of each ESI variation from the median rank. In this regard, the smaller the deviations from the median rank are, the more robust the composite indicator is. As we can see in Table 7, the average shift in ranking is close to 0 in all cases, especially when the ordinal linear aggregation method

is used. As a consequence, we can conclude that all the regressions done give similar results.

5. Results

The aim of this paper is to check the two hypotheses aforementioned in the introduction. The first one is to test whether, according to the samples selected in ESI, the divergence in sovereignty among northern and periphery Eurozone countries during the crisis existed or not. The second one is to estimate whether the evolution of sovereignty calculated in ESI maintains a significant linear relationship with the erosion of national democracy in peripheral Europe.

In Annex 3 and Annex 4 the details about correlations and evolution of ESI and national democracy can be found. As a means of simplifying, a summary is shown in Table 8. We can observe that, during the pre-crisis period, any negative correlation was either inexistent, low or country-isolated –e.g. Germany or Italy–. However, during the post-crash period, in general terms, the correlation between the ESI and national democracy was negative and significant for those member states that were in the looser side of the Eurozone crisis.

Table 8. National democracy and sovereignty. Evolution and correlations

	National democracy evolution	**ESI evolution**	**Correlation Democracy-ESI**
Belgium	Lower democratic dissatisfaction in comparison with the EZ-11 average in spite of its increase during the first phase of the post-crash period. The democratic standards are recovered since 2013.	Belgium had a worse performance in the ESI than the EZ-11 ESI average. However, the ESI contraction as a consequence of the crisis is less harsh than the EZ-11 average. Belgium's ESI remain less affected due to the business cycle.	No correlation between democracy and ESI.
Germany	Dissatisfaction with democracy has decreased in general terms, with three exceptions. In 2003 due to Agenda 2010, at the beginning of the crisis,	German ESI either has remained stable during the pre-crash period or has increased in a divergent way from the EZ-11 ESI average during the post-crash	During the pre-crash period, there is a significative negative correlation between democracy and ESI, but in the post-crash period this connection disappears.

	and in the last step of the crisis.	period.	
Ireland	Ireland initially had low levels of democracy dissatisfaction in relation to EZ-11, but after the economic crash the dissatisfaction increased dramatically until 2013.	Ireland, due to its idiosyncratic conditions (i.e. the Celtic Tiger), had a hard contraction on ESI during the crisis, coming from a good ESI, in line with the EZ-11 ESI levels. Ireland signed a MoU with the EU for the period of 2010-2013.	During the pre-crash period, there is no significant negative correlation between democracy and ESI, but in the post-crash period this connection is negative and significant.
Greece	Greece suffered a hard contraction in national democracy since the beginning of the crisis, with a small, insufficient recovery since 2013. Greece had the so-called technocratic government from 2011 to 2012.	Greece suffered a big contraction of ESI during the crisis. Greece has been able to reduce this impact by reducing the influence of private markets on public financing thanks to the implementation of different MoU's (2010-).	During the pre-crash period, there is no significant negative correlation between democracy and ESI, but in the post-crash period this connection is highly negative and significant.
Spain	Spain had less dissatisfaction with national democracy than the EZ-11 average, but during the post-crash period national democracy suffered a heavy erosion.	Spain suffered a hard contraction of ESI during the crisis, significantly harsher than the EZ-11 average. Spain was under the influence of a MoU from 2012 to 2013.	During the pre-crash period, the negative correlation between ESI and democracy was not significant enough. During the post-crash period, the correlation was negative and significant.
France	In France, the dissatisfaction with national democracy has increased during the crisis, following a similar path than the EZ-11 average.	France has suffered a reduction of ESI at a similar size than the EZ-11 average.	Although the negative correlation increased during the post-crash period, there is no significant correlation between ESI and democracy in the period of interest.
Italy	Italian dissatisfaction with democracy has been above the EZ-11 average throughout the period analyzed, but suffered a significant increase during the first part (2008-09) and the second part (2011-12) of the crisis. Italy had the so-called 'technocratic' government from 2011	Italy suffered a contraction of ESI during the crisis, but the country remained above the ESI EZ-11 average during that same period.	The correlation is negative and significant throughout the period, but less strong than in Greece and Spain. The levels of dissatisfaction before the EZ crisis are inconsistent with the hypothesis about the hard connection between ESI and democracy. Therefore, the loss of democratic quality is more multidimensional in the

	to 2013.		case of Italy.
Netherlands	The Netherlands has maintained within the EZ-11 average regarding democratic quality during the pre-crash period. During the post-crash period, it has kept its democratic standards reasonably stable.	The Netherlands has suffered a decrease in ESI during the crisis, but less harsh than the EZ-11 ESI average.	No correlation between democracy and ESI.
Austria	Austria dissatisfaction with democracy has increased during the crisis, but has remained constantly below the EZ-11 average.	Austria has displayed a better performance in ESI than the EZ-11 average. Although it has suffered a contraction during the crisis, it has maintained a higher standard than the EZ-11 average.	No correlation between democracy and ESI.
Portugal	Dissatisfaction with democracy has been higher in Portugal than in the EZ-11 average throughout the period. It has increased significantly during the post-crash period. Satisfaction with democracy has increased since 2014.	Portugal has suffered a harder contraction of ESI than the EZ-11 average during the post-crash period. Portugal has had a MoU from 2011 to 2014.	There is a negative and significant correlation between democracy and ESI during the post-crash period. During the pre-crash period, the correlation is negative, but not significant.
Finland	Finland has maintained high democratic standards in comparison with the rest of the EZ countries. During the first period of the crisis, dissatisfaction with democracy increased, but always remained below the EZ-11 average.	Finland has maintained stable ESI levels, but it showed a small contraction during the first phase of the crisis.	No correlation between democracy and ESI.

Source: Own elaboration. Data from Annex 4 and Annex 5.

Using the median rank of the linear regressions of Economic Sovereignty Index and re-scaling the sample in percentages, the divergence on national discretion among northern and periphery countries of the Eurozone during the crisis as is explained by Matthijs is true according to ESI, as we can see in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Economic Sovereignty Index. Northern vs Peripherical Eurozone countries (1998-2016).



Source: Own elaboration. Data from Annex 3.

Moreover, as shown in Annex 3 and summarized in Table 8, the member states that suffered a harsh contraction of national economic autonomy during the EMU crisis also suffered a considerable increase in national democratic dissatisfaction. All of the periphery countries considered in this paper are/were under a MoU with international institutions or/and technocratic governments at some point of the Eurozone crisis. In general terms, this has not improved the ESI performance and democratic satisfaction, but data shows that the deterioration of both variables happened before these unusual arrangements.

Summing up, we can observe that during the pre-crash period (1999-2007) the ESI levels were quite similar among EMU members, and dissatisfaction with democracy was divided into about three groups of countries. First of all, we have Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and Belgium, which were below the EZ-11 average on democratic dissatisfaction; secondly, there are Germany, France and Greece, which

were slightly above the EZ-11 average, and, lastly, Italy and Portugal, which were above the 50% of dissatisfaction with national democracy (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Relationship between ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy (1999-2007)



Source: Own elaboration. Data from Annex 3 and Eurobarometer.

Otherwise, during the post-crash period (2008-2016), the ESI levels decreased for all of the EZ-11 countries – with the exception of Germany. However, the contraction in some of the periphery Eurozone countries, such as Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal, was very harsh. The biggest of the Southern, Italy, suffered a softer ESI contraction in comparison with its peripheral peers, due to the fact that it maintained its levels of unemployment and external imbalances in a less severe position. During this second phase, democratic dissatisfaction increased sharply in periphery countries, especially in Greece and Spain, which were coming from a better position than Italy and Portugal. Ireland followed a similar pattern to that of Greece and Spain until 2013. Nonetheless, as early as 2013, Ireland started to recover its democratic quality until it attained its pre-crisis levels in 2016. Furthermore, northern EMU countries such as Belgium, Austria and France suffered a below-the-EZ-11-average increase in national democratic dissatisfaction. Paradoxically, other countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland improved their democratic standards (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Relationship between ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy (2008-2016)



Source: Own elaboration. Data from Annex 3 and Eurobarometer.

6. Conclusions

Matthias Matthijs pointed out in his paper 'Integration at what price?' (2017) that, in the case of the Eurozone, the trilemma of globalization postulated by Dani Rodrik doesn't explain the European picture accurately enough. Matthijs (2017) deems it a reality that northern Eurozone countries have maintained national sovereignty and national democracy, whereas periphery Eurozone countries have been obliged to give up both.

In this paper, by using quantitative analyses, I have put forward a composite indicator's proposal in order to quantify national economic sovereignty in the Eurozone. This proposal, which contemplates different methods of calculation, has been materialized in eight different variations of an index which has been defined as the ESI.

In addition, accepting the limitations of quantitative analyses and composite indicators, I have checked that there was a divergence on national sovereignty among northern and periphery Eurozone countries during the crisis. As explained in Section 2, that is probably because of the diversity in growth models in the EMU.

Furthermore, I have tested the connection between economic discretion and the erosion of national democracy. For the Eurozone as a whole, such correlation is inexistent

during the pre-crash period (1999-2007). On the contrary, the connection is highly negative and significant for peripheral Europe during the post-crash period (2008-2016), in contrast with northern Europe, where it is either inexistent or negative, but weak.

With these results, we can conclude that the connection between democracy and sovereignty, which shapes the creation of the EMU, has asymmetric impacts among Member States. Periphery Eurozone countries have suffered a deterioration of both variables, while northern Eurozone countries have kept them stable despite the short-term impact of the Great Recession. As a consequence, in spite of certain idiosyncratic issues that must not be disregarded in some Member States (e.g. Italy), Matthijs (2017) hypothesis that the divergence on dissatisfaction with democracy among Eurozone countries is a phenomenon that must be mainly explained by the lack of national discretion in peripheral Europe happens to be a reasonable one, verifiable with quantitative data.

In conclusion, the EMU has different effects on democracy and sovereignty of nation-states. This issue is relevant when considering the challenge of a hypothetical EMU reform, since achieving consensus on common goals can be difficult if the starting points of nation-states regarding recent events are dissimilar.

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Annex 1. Data normalization: results

Z-Score normalization

Table 1A. Z-score normalization of the variable 'A'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-0.88	-0.47	-0.03	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.17	0.30	0.41	0.56	0.64	0.55	0.56	0.71	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.71	0.83
Germany	0.52	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.73	0.62	0.59	0.53	0.65	0.82	0.93	0.92	1.02	1.13	1.20	1.28	1.34	1.40	1.46
Ireland	0.74	1.17	1.35	1.45	1.44	1.45	1.48	1.49	1.49	1.48	1.36	0.77	0.21	-0.16	-0.59	-0.42	0.03	0.75	1.01
Greece	-1.49	-1.69	-1.17	-0.82	-0.45	-0.09	-0.21	-0.07	0.20	0.27	0.28	-0.12	-1.08	-3.14	-2.94	-2.42	-2.21	-1.63	-1.16
Spain	-0.79	-0.05	0.27	0.50	0.55	0.69	0.85	1.07	1.16	1.19	1.01	0.54	0.28	-0.28	-1.06	-1.68	-1.47	-0.85	-0.37
France	0.43	0.58	0.77	0.83	0.83	0.80	0.78	0.80	0.84	0.89	0.89	0.85	0.84	0.78	0.73	0.79	0.84	0.88	0.96
Italy	-1.61	-0.91	-0.60	-0.36	-0.05	0.12	0.30	0.38	0.55	0.59	0.44	0.41	0.33	0.22	-0.38	-0.50	-0.48	-0.15	-0.04
Netherlands	0.87	1.06	1.21	1.33	1.31	1.24	1.17	1.19	1.29	1.36	1.38	1.33	1.33	1.33	1.31	1.25	1.27	1.34	1.42
Austria	1.04	1.13	1.15	1.13	1.10	1.10	1.05	0.99	1.05	1.09	1.21	1.05	1.15	1.19	1.17	1.14	1.16	1.17	1.19
Portugal	0.95	1.06	1.09	1.10	1.01	0.93	0.92	0.83	0.75	0.67	0.65	0.49	0.37	-0.39	-1.18	-1.27	-0.88	-0.46	-0.07
Finland	0.23	0.57	0.68	0.80	0.98	1.06	1.11	1.16	1.23	1.30	1.33	1.26	1.25	1.26	1.26	1.28	1.27	1.26	1.31

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO

Table 2A. Z-score normalization of the variable 'B'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-2.23	-1.86	-1.49	-1.29	-1.78	-2.17	-2.38	-2.56	-2.56	-2.26	-2.02	-2.22	-2.74	-2.31	-2.55	-3.05	-3.33	-3.45	-3.32
Germany	0.57	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.52	0.24	-0.03	-0.35	-0.30	-0.03	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.53	0.63	0.66	0.66	0.70	0.81
Ireland	-1.24	-0.49	-0.13	0.01	-0.27	-0.11	0.00	-0.06	-0.25	-0.47	-1.22	-3.74	-4.70	-5.58	-5.76	-4.97	-5.67	-5.28	-3.86
Greece	0.96	0.72	0.61	0.75	0.92	1.07	0.99	0.97	1.01	1.06	1.14	1.06	0.32	-0.73	-2.09	-2.80	-2.83	-2.77	-2.43
Spain	-0.70	-0.33	-0.08	0.14	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.36	0.47	0.46	-0.07	-1.08	-1.65	-2.10	-2.78	-3.20	-3.19	-2.77	-2.26
France	0.37	0.38	0.44	0.59	0.57	0.45	0.32	0.27	0.24	0.39	0.52	0.30	0.19	0.15	-0.01	-0.17	-0.26	-0.42	-0.40
Italy	0.50	0.48	0.53	0.68	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.77	0.87	0.94	0.88	0.80	0.53	0.56	0.29	0.06	-0.14	-0.21	-0.25
Netherlands	0.16	0.39	0.42	0.68	0.43	-0.07	-0.53	-0.79	-0.46	-0.10	0.15	-0.04	-0.53	-0.65	-1.20	-2.17	-2.36	-2.36	-1.86
Austria	0.68	0.80	0.80	0.71	0.61	0.43	0.11	0.05	0.14	0.23	0.54	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.16	-0.05	-0.19	-0.31	-0.52
Portugal	0.93	1.04	1.09	1.09	0.85	0.57	0.45	0.37	0.16	0.05	0.15	-0.12	-0.58	-1.02	-1.97	-2.52	-2.07	-1.87	-1.52
Finland	-0.01	0.16	0.10	0.23	0.16	0.14	0.11	-0.05	0.09	0.22	0.26	-0.03	-0.15	-0.07	-0.11	-0.32	-0.42	-0.81	-0.77

Source: Own elaboration. WTO and AMECO.

Table 3A. Z-score normalization of the variable 'C'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-1.67	-1.40	-1.36	-1.13	-1.28	-1.45	-1.68	-1.86	-2.02	-1.79	-1.94	-1.53	-1.92	-1.99	-2.26	-2.64	-2.92	-3.00	-2.89
Germany	0.69	0.68	0.58	0.59	0.55	0.40	0.21	-0.05	-0.14	-0.01	0.13	0.32	0.24	0.30	0.34	0.37	0.40	0.45	0.53
Ireland	-2.19	-1.47	-1.18	-1.13	-1.22	-1.15	-1.08	-1.23	-1.35	-1.61	-2.79	-6.62	-8.38	-8.92	-9.82	-8.56	-8.14	-7.01	-5.98
Greece	0.64	0.43	0.08	0.15	0.39	0.56	0.40	0.42	0.37	0.33	0.34	0.49	0.10	-0.74	-1.70	-2.24	-2.43	-2.27	-2.06
Spain	-0.05	0.05	0.01	0.20	0.15	0.13	0.07	0.23	0.21	0.18	-0.11	-0.29	-0.85	-1.31	-1.75	-1.97	-1.97	-1.69	-1.36
France	0.61	0.59	0.53	0.61	0.61	0.59	0.49	0.42	0.34	0.40	0.49	0.49	0.33	0.23	0.10	0.03	-0.04	-0.10	-0.09
Italy	0.63	0.64	0.54	0.63	0.69	0.70	0.67	0.63	0.60	0.63	0.56	0.68	0.41	0.33	0.04	-0.09	-0.18	-0.15	-0.15

Netherlands	0.16	0.31	0.28	0.53	0.40	0.12	-0.25	-0.39	-0.27	-0.04	0.12	0.09	-0.37	-0.52	-0.93	-1.53	-1.75	-1.68	-1.34
Austria	0.64	0.71	0.67	0.58	0.55	0.46	0.26	0.17	0.16	0.22	0.38	0.35	0.28	0.24	0.16	0.03	-0.03	-0.08	-0.17
Portugal	0.56	0.62	0.60	0.62	0.47	0.28	0.13	-0.09	-0.32	-0.36	-0.37	-0.29	-0.81	-1.10	-1.73	-2.07	-1.72	-1.54	-1.28
Finland	-0.02	0.10	-0.33	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.13	-0.31	-0.36	-0.15	-0.17	-0.22	-0.38	-0.43	-0.53	-0.66	-0.72	-0.93	-0.80

Source: Own elaboration. OECD and AMECO.

Table 4A. Z-score normalization of the variable 'D'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.99	1.73	1.24	1.18	1.24	0.86	0.76	0.50	0.50	0.61	0.18	-0.03	0.50	0.12	0.25	0.03	-0.12	0.05	0.25
Germany	-0.26	-0.24	-0.16	0.14	0.46	0.12	0.63	0.48	0.95	1.50	1.50	1.48	1.58	1.95	2.22	2.20	2.41	2.80	2.82
Ireland	0.46	0.73	1.10	1.10	0.97	1.01	0.90	0.20	-0.20	-0.50	-0.80	-1.67	-1.33	-1.58	-1.80	-0.46	-0.18	2.20	0.90
Greece	-1.03	-1.43	-1.75	-1.54	-1.75	-1.97	-2.01	-2.14	-2.48	-3.13	-2.99	-2.77	-3.24	-4.05	-4.13	-4.39	-4.09	-3.45	-3.37
Spain	-1.97	-1.71	-1.58	-1.31	-1.35	-1.39	-1.65	-1.67	-1.84	-1.90	-2.50	-2.84	-3.18	-3.35	-3.43	-3.35	-3.09	-2.58	-1.88
France	0.48	0.65	0.61	0.82	0.65	0.42	0.22	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.10	-0.22	-0.26	-0.29	-0.46	-0.50	-0.58	-0.41	-0.46
Italy	-0.09	-0.20	-0.22	0.08	0.01	-0.03	0.12	0.05	0.12	0.29	-0.14	-0.16	-0.63	-0.54	-0.46	-0.48	-0.41	-0.33	-0.03
Netherlands	1.44	1.73	1.48	1.71	1.61	1.97	2.12	1.92	2.50	2.26	1.97	2.18	2.39	2.75	2.94	2.43	2.14	2.26	2.39
Austria	0.48	0.50	0.90	0.86	1.39	1.18	1.16	1.18	1.46	1.65	1.97	1.31	1.48	1.24	1.16	1.14	1.22	1.07	1.05
Portugal	-1.01	-1.18	-1.50	-1.41	-1.24	-1.22	-1.54	-2.09	-2.28	-2.11	-2.56	-2.60	-2.82	-2.14	-1.86	-1.26	-1.09	-0.77	-0.37
Finland	0.52	0.80	1.39	1.67	1.69	0.95	1.29	0.78	1.05	1.22	0.99	0.54	0.35	-0.16	-0.16	-0.20	-0.24	-0.33	-0.29

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

Table 5A. Z-score normalization of the variable 'E'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-0.08	0.33	1.14	1.32	0.71	0.76	0.81	1.28	1.14	1.05	2.16	0.41	1.25	1.76	1.80	1.18	1.14	1.51	2.28
Germany	1.47	1.44	1.70	1.98	1.76	1.61	1.85	2.41	2.53	2.58	2.95	1.42	1.39	1.88	2.16	2.13	2.16	2.29	2.52
Ireland	0.33	0.76	1.71	1.48	1.44	1.13	0.30	0.28	0.66	1.05	1.48	-0.57	-0.48	-0.46	1.18	1.59	2.10	2.54	2.80
Greece	0.50	1.13	1.93	2.63	2.61	2.64	2.56	3.04	2.78	2.41	2.14	-1.02	-1.89	-5.11	-8.28	-3.93	-2.36	-2.57	-1.17
Spain	-0.47	-0.59	-0.15	-0.04	0.44	0.77	0.48	1.06	1.32	1.11	1.76	-0.31	-0.69	-2.61	-5.31	-6.26	-5.88	-5.10	-4.38
France	-2.21	-1.34	-0.65	-0.26	-0.50	-0.17	0.08	0.82	0.93	0.72	0.23	-3.01	-2.96	-3.38	-4.34	-5.12	-4.47	-3.52	-2.44
Italy	-0.07	-0.02	0.55	0.86	0.97	1.10	0.77	0.99	0.84	0.90	1.58	0.12	0.48	0.47	0.37	-0.15	0.00	0.35	0.49
Netherlands	-0.43	-0.18	-0.03	1.47	1.22	0.95	0.81	1.21	1.44	1.47	1.51	0.90	0.92	1.44	1.13	0.51	-0.29	0.20	0.40
Austria	1.43	1.52	1.91	2.20	1.67	1.37	1.48	1.46	1.14	1.03	1.52	-0.01	0.22	0.19	-0.84	-1.12	-0.35	0.20	0.89
Portugal	-0.40	0.05	0.14	1.10	0.91	1.07	0.90	1.17	1.57	1.47	1.69	-0.15	0.20	-0.54	-0.90	-0.39	0.13	0.59	0.58
Finland	-0.07	0.48	1.31	1.69	1.44	1.27	0.58	0.97	1.21	1.47	2.28	0.91	1.09	1.96	2.24	1.89	1.71	1.67	2.15

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

Min-max normalization

Table 6A. Min-max normalization of the variable 'A'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.49	0.58	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.72	0.74	0.77	0.80	0.82	0.80	0.80	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.86
Germany	0.79	0.83	0.84	0.85	0.83	0.81	0.81	0.79	0.82	0.86	0.88	0.88	0.90	0.92	0.94	0.95	0.97	0.98	0.99
Ireland	0.84	0.93	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.97	0.84	0.72	0.64	0.55	0.59	0.68	0.84	0.89
Greece	0.36	0.31	0.43	0.50	0.58	0.66	0.63	0.66	0.72	0.74	0.74	0.65	0.44	0.00	0.04	0.16	0.20	0.33	0.43

Spain	0.51	0.67	0.74	0.79	0.80	0.83	0.86	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.90	0.79	0.74	0.62	0.45	0.31	0.36	0.49	0.60
France	0.77	0.80	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.83	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.88
Italy	0.33	0.48	0.55	0.60	0.67	0.70	0.74	0.76	0.80	0.80	0.77	0.77	0.75	0.72	0.60	0.57	0.57	0.65	0.67
Netherlands	0.86	0.91	0.94	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.93	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.97	0.98
Austria	0.90	0.92	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.91	0.94	0.90	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.94
Portugal	0.88	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.86	0.84	0.82	0.82	0.78	0.76	0.59	0.42	0.40	0.49	0.58	0.66
Finland	0.73	0.80	0.82	0.85	0.89	0.91	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.96

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

Table 7A Min-max normalization of the variable 'B'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.51	0.57	0.62	0.65	0.58	0.52	0.49	0.46	0.46	0.51	0.54	0.51	0.44	0.50	0.46	0.39	0.35	0.33	0.35
Germany	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.91	0.87	0.83	0.78	0.79	0.83	0.87	0.88	0.87	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.95
Ireland	0.66	0.76	0.82	0.84	0.80	0.82	0.84	0.83	0.80	0.77	0.66	0.29	0.15	0.03	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.07	0.28
Greece	0.97	0.94	0.92	0.94	0.97	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	1.00	0.99	0.88	0.73	0.53	0.43	0.42	0.43	0.48
Spain	0.73	0.79	0.82	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.83	0.68	0.60	0.53	0.43	0.37	0.37	0.43	0.51
France	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.90	0.88	0.87	0.87	0.89	0.91	0.88	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.77	0.78
Italy	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.91	0.92	0.88	0.84	0.81	0.80	0.80
Netherlands	0.86	0.89	0.90	0.93	0.90	0.82	0.76	0.72	0.77	0.82	0.86	0.83	0.76	0.74	0.66	0.52	0.49	0.49	0.57
Austria	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.92	0.90	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.87	0.91	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.86	0.83	0.81	0.79	0.76
Portugal	0.97	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.96	0.92	0.90	0.89	0.86	0.84	0.86	0.82	0.75	0.69	0.55	0.47	0.53	0.56	0.61
Finland	0.83	0.86	0.85	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.83	0.85	0.87	0.87	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.82	0.79	0.77	0.72	0.72

Source: Own elaboration. WTO and AMECO.

Table 8A. Min-max normalization of the variable 'C'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.77	0.80	0.80	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.77	0.76	0.74	0.76	0.75	0.79	0.75	0.74	0.72	0.68	0.66	0.65	0.66
Germany	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.95	0.93	0.92	0.93	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.98
Ireland	0.72	0.79	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.80	0.78	0.67	0.30	0.14	0.09	0.00	0.12	0.16	0.27	0.37
Greece	0.99	0.97	0.94	0.95	0.97	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.94	0.86	0.77	0.72	0.70	0.72	0.74
Spain	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.92	0.91	0.85	0.81	0.77	0.75	0.75	0.77	0.80
France	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.96	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.92
Italy	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.97	0.96	0.94	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Netherlands	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.94	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.94	0.94	0.90	0.88	0.84	0.79	0.77	0.77	0.81
Austria	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.92
Portugal	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.92	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.86	0.83	0.77	0.74	0.77	0.79	0.81
Finland	0.93	0.94	0.90	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.90	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.86

Source: Own elaboration. OECD and AMECO.

Table 9A. Min-max normalization of the variable 'D'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.73	0.83	0.77	0.76	0.77	0.72	0.70	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.62	0.59	0.67	0.61	0.63	0.60	0.58	0.61	0.63
Germany	0.56	0.57	0.58	0.62	0.66	0.61	0.68	0.66	0.73	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.86	0.90	0.90	0.93	0.98	0.98

Ireland	0.66	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.73	0.74	0.72	0.63	0.57	0.53	0.49	0.37	0.42	0.38	0.35	0.54	0.57	0.90	0.72
Greece	0.46	0.40	0.36	0.39	0.36	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.26	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.16	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.13	0.14
Spain	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.34	0.26	0.21	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.18	0.25	0.34
France	0.66	0.69	0.68	0.71	0.69	0.66	0.63	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.61	0.57	0.56	0.56	0.54	0.53	0.52	0.54	0.54
Italy	0.59	0.57	0.57	0.61	0.60	0.59	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.64	0.58	0.58	0.51	0.52	0.54	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.59
Netherlands	0.79	0.83	0.80	0.83	0.82	0.87	0.89	0.86	0.94	0.91	0.87	0.90	0.92	0.97	1.00	0.93	0.89	0.91	0.92
Austria	0.66	0.67	0.72	0.72	0.79	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.80	0.82	0.87	0.78	0.80	0.77	0.76	0.75	0.77	0.74	0.74
Portugal	0.46	0.44	0.39	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.39	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.25	0.24	0.21	0.31	0.34	0.43	0.45	0.49	0.55
Finland	0.67	0.71	0.79	0.83	0.83	0.73	0.77	0.70	0.74	0.77	0.73	0.67	0.65	0.58	0.58	0.57	0.57	0.55	0.56

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

Table 10A. Min-max normalization of the variable 'E'

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.72	0.76	0.83	0.85	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.84	0.83	0.82	0.92	0.77	0.84	0.89	0.89	0.84	0.83	0.87	0.93
Germany	0.86	0.86	0.88	0.91	0.89	0.87	0.90	0.94	0.96	0.96	0.99	0.86	0.85	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.95
Ireland	0.76	0.80	0.88	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.76	0.76	0.79	0.82	0.86	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.84	0.87	0.92	0.96	0.98
Greece	0.78	0.83	0.90	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.96	1.00	0.98	0.94	0.92	0.64	0.56	0.28	0.00	0.38	0.52	0.50	0.63
Spain	0.69	0.68	0.72	0.73	0.77	0.80	0.77	0.83	0.85	0.83	0.89	0.70	0.67	0.50	0.26	0.18	0.21	0.28	0.34
France	0.54	0.61	0.67	0.71	0.69	0.72	0.74	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.75	0.47	0.47	0.43	0.35	0.28	0.34	0.42	0.52
Italy	0.73	0.73	0.78	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.80	0.82	0.81	0.81	0.87	0.74	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.72	0.73	0.76	0.77
Netherlands	0.69	0.72	0.73	0.86	0.84	0.82	0.80	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.81	0.81	0.86	0.83	0.78	0.71	0.75	0.77
Austria	0.86	0.87	0.90	0.93	0.88	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.82	0.87	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.66	0.63	0.70	0.75	0.81
Portugal	0.70	0.74	0.74	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.84	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.72	0.75	0.68	0.65	0.70	0.74	0.78	0.78
Finland	0.73	0.77	0.85	0.88	0.86	0.84	0.78	0.82	0.84	0.86	0.93	0.81	0.83	0.91	0.93	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.92

Source: Own elaboration. AMECO.

Annex 2. Principal Component Analysis

Table 11A. Eigenvalues

	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5
Eigenvalue	2.080	1.318	0.999	0.525	0.078
Variability (%)	41.592	26.370	19.986	10.492	1.560
Cumulative %	41.592	67.962	87.948	98.440	100.000

Figure 1A. Scree plot diagram



Table 12A. Factor loadings

	Factor loadings			Squared factor loading		
	F1	F2	F3	F1	F2	F3
cf	-0.057	0.893	0.038	0.00	**0.80**	0.00
ist	0.934	0.281	0.050	**0.87**	0.08	0.00
ice	0.943	0.124	0.156	**0.89**	0.02	0.02
cab	0.549	-0.633	-0.139	0.30	**0.40**	0.02
nns	-0.119	-0.159	0.976	0.01	0.03	**0.95**
Expl.Var	0.266824	0.3168482	0.1913629			
Expl.Tot	0.3442735	0.4088179	0.2469087			

Table 13A. Weights in Principal Component Analysis

	Squared factor · Expl Tot	PCA
cf	0.326	0.245
ist	0.300	0.225
ice	0.306	0.230
cab	0.164	0.123
nns	0.235	0.176
Scale	1.3315053	1

Source: Annex 1 database.

Annex 3. Economic Sovereignty Index results

Ordinal Linear Aggregation

Table 14A. ESI with EW, min-max and ordinal linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	8	7	8	8	9	9	8	8	9	9	8	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	7
Germany	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	7	8	9	10	9	8	8	7	6	6
Greece	5	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	6	6	7	8	9	10	10	10	10	10
Spain	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	6	5	5	7	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	9
France	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
Italy	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	5	5	5	4	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Austria	3	2	3	4	3	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Portugal	5	5	5	5	6	6	5	6	7	8	8	8	8	9	8	8	7	7	7
Finland	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	5

Table 15A. ESI with EW, z-score and ordinal linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	8	7	8	8	9	9	8	8	9	9	8	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	7
Germany	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	7	8	9	10	9	8	8	7	6	6
Greece	5	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	6	6	7	8	9	10	10	10	10	10
Spain	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	6	5	5	7	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	9
France	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
Italy	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	5	5	5	4	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Austria	3	2	3	4	3	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Portugal	5	5	5	5	6	6	5	6	7	8	8	8	8	9	8	8	7	7	7
Finland	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	5

Table 16A. ESI with PCA, min-max and ordinal linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	8	8	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	8	7
Germany	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	9	10	9	9	8	8	7	7
Greece	5	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	5	6	7	7	9	9	10	10	10	10
Spain	9	9	9	8	9	8	7	5	5	5	7	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9
France	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	5	6	6	6	5
Italy	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	6	6	5	4	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Austria	2	2	2	4	3	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Portugal	5	4	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	8	8	8	8	9	8	8	7	7	7
Finland	7	7	7	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	5

Table 17A. ESI with PCA, z-score and ordinal linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	8	8	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	8	7
Germany	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	9	10	9	9	8	8	7	7
Greece	5	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	5	6	7	7	9	9	10	10	10	10
Spain	9	9	9	8	9	8	7	5	5	5	7	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9
France	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	5	6	6	6	5
Italy	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	6	6	5	4	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Austria	2	2	2	4	3	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Portugal	5	4	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	8	8	8	8	9	8	8	7	7	7
Finland	7	7	7	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	5

Table 18A. Median rank

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	8	8	8	8	9	10	9	8	9	9	8	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Germany	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	9	10	9	9	8	7	7	7
Greece	5	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	5	6	7	8	9	10	10	10	10	10
Spain	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	5	5	5	7	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	9
France	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
Italy	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	6	6	5	4	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Austria	3	2	2	4	3	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Portugal	5	5	4	5	5	6	5	6	7	8	8	8	8	9	8	8	7	7	7
Finland	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	5

Linear Aggregation

Table 19A. ESI with EW, min-max and linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.65	0.71	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.69	0.70	0.71	0.70	0.67	0.65	0.66	0.69
Germany	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.84	0.88	0.90	0.87	0.88	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.96	0.97
Ireland	0.73	0.80	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.73	0.50	0.42	0.37	0.35	0.45	0.47	0.61	0.65
Greece	0.71	0.69	0.71	0.75	0.77	0.79	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.76	0.76	0.70	0.60	0.38	0.28	0.34	0.38	0.42	0.48
Spain	0.64	0.69	0.72	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.76	0.79	0.80	0.79	0.76	0.66	0.60	0.52	0.41	0.35	0.37	0.45	0.52
France	0.77	0.80	0.82	0.84	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.75	0.74	0.73	0.70	0.68	0.69	0.71	0.73
Italy	0.71	0.74	0.76	0.79	0.81	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.81	0.78	0.78	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.74	0.75
Netherlands	0.83	0.86	0.86	0.91	0.90	0.88	0.86	0.85	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.89	0.87	0.88	0.86	0.79	0.76	0.78	0.81
Austria	0.87	0.88	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.87	0.88	0.91	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.83	0.83
Portugal	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.78	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.74	0.69	0.67	0.62	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.64	0.68
Finland	0.78	0.82	0.84	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.87	0.88	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.80
Northern EZ	0.79	0.82	0.83	0.86	0.85	0.83	0.82	0.81	0.83	0.84	0.86	0.81	0.81	0.82	0.81	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.81
Southern EZ	0.71	0.73	0.75	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.77	0.71	0.66	0.58	0.49	0.49	0.52	0.56	0.61

Table 20A. ESI with EW, min-max and linear aggregation. Ranking

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	10	9	9	9	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	9	7	7	6	7	7	7	7
Germany	3	3	5	4	4	5	4	6	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	6	3	5	5	4	5	7	8	8	11	11	11	11	10	9	9	9	9
Greece	8	10	11	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	7	7	10	10	11	11	10	11	11
Spain	11	11	10	11	10	10	10	8	7	7	8	10	9	9	9	10	11	10	10
France	6	7	6	6	6	6	7	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6
Italy	9	8	8	8	8	7	6	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	4	4	4	3
Austria	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	3	3	3	4	3	2	2	2
Portugal	4	5	7	7	7	8	8	10	10	10	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Finland	5	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	3	3	4

Table 21A. ESI with EW, z-score and linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-0.77	-0.33	-0.10	0.03	-0.21	-0.39	-0.46	-0.47	-0.51	-0.37	-0.20	-0.57	-0.47	-0.34	-0.42	-0.77	-0.92	-0.83	-0.57
Germany	0.60	0.64	0.69	0.83	0.80	0.60	0.65	0.60	0.74	0.97	1.15	0.88	0.90	1.15	1.31	1.33	1.39	1.53	1.63
Ireland	-0.38	0.14	0.57	0.58	0.47	0.47	0.32	0.14	0.07	-0.01	-0.40	-2.37	-2.93	-3.34	-3.36	-2.56	-2.37	-1.36	-1.03
Greece	-0.08	-0.17	-0.06	0.24	0.34	0.44	0.35	0.44	0.38	0.19	0.18	-0.47	-1.16	-2.75	-3.83	-3.15	-2.78	-2.54	-2.04
Spain	-0.79	-0.53	-0.31	-0.10	-0.05	0.03	-0.05	0.21	0.26	0.21	0.02	-0.80	-1.22	-1.93	-2.87	-3.29	-3.12	-2.60	-2.05
France	-0.06	0.17	0.34	0.52	0.43	0.42	0.38	0.48	0.49	0.52	0.45	-0.32	-0.37	-0.50	-0.79	-0.99	-0.90	-0.71	-0.49
Italy	-0.13	0.00	0.16	0.38	0.47	0.53	0.52	0.56	0.59	0.67	0.67	0.37	0.22	0.21	-0.03	-0.23	-0.24	-0.09	0.00
Netherlands	0.44	0.66	0.67	1.14	0.99	0.84	0.66	0.63	0.90	0.99	1.03	0.89	0.75	0.87	0.65	0.10	-0.20	-0.05	0.20
Austria	0.85	0.93	1.09	1.10	1.06	0.91	0.81	0.77	0.79	0.84	1.12	0.59	0.68	0.63	0.36	0.23	0.36	0.41	0.49
Portugal	0.21	0.32	0.29	0.50	0.40	0.33	0.17	0.04	-0.03	-0.06	-0.09	-0.54	-0.73	-1.04	-1.53	-1.50	-1.13	-0.81	-0.53
Finland	0.13	0.42	0.63	0.87	0.85	0.67	0.59	0.51	0.65	0.81	0.94	0.49	0.43	0.51	0.54	0.40	0.32	0.17	0.32
Northern EZ	0.20	0.42	0.55	0.75	0.65	0.51	0.44	0.42	0.51	0.63	0.75	0.33	0.32	0.39	0.27	0.05	0.01	0.09	0.26
Southern EZ	-0.20	-0.09	0.02	0.25	0.29	0.33	0.25	0.31	0.30	0.25	0.20	-0.36	-0.72	-1.38	-2.06	-2.04	-1.82	-1.51	-1.15

Table 22A. ESI with EW, z-score and linear aggregation. Ranking

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	10	10	10	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	9	7	6	6	6	7	8	8
Germany	2	3	2	4	4	4	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ireland	9	7	5	5	6	6	8	9	9	9	11	11	11	11	10	9	9	9	9
Greece	7	9	9	9	9	7	7	7	7	8	7	7	9	10	11	10	10	10	10
Spain	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	8	8	7	8	10	10	9	9	11	11	11	11
France	6	6	6	6	7	8	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	6	6	6
Italy	8	8	8	8	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	3	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	4	4	4	4
Austria	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	2	2	2
Portugal	4	5	7	7	8	9	9	10	10	10	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7
Finland	5	4	4	3	3	3	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	3	3	3

Table 23A. ESI with PCA, min-max and linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	0.63	0.69	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.70	0.70	0.72	0.70	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.68
Germany	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.85	0.85	0.83	0.85	0.88	0.90	0.88	0.89	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.97
Ireland	0.73	0.81	0.86	0.87	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.83	0.82	0.81	0.75	0.51	0.41	0.35	0.32	0.42	0.44	0.56	0.62
Greece	0.73	0.71	0.74	0.78	0.80	0.83	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.75	0.65	0.42	0.31	0.37	0.41	0.45	0.51
Spain	0.67	0.72	0.76	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.81	0.71	0.65	0.56	0.45	0.38	0.40	0.48	0.55
France	0.79	0.82	0.84	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.85	0.79	0.78	0.76	0.74	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.76
Italy	0.72	0.75	0.78	0.81	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.86	0.83	0.81	0.81	0.76	0.74	0.73	0.76	0.77
Netherlands	0.84	0.87	0.88	0.93	0.91	0.88	0.86	0.85	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.89	0.87	0.88	0.85	0.78	0.75	0.77	0.80
Austria	0.89	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.89	0.92	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.84
Portugal	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.74	0.71	0.65	0.56	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.69
Finland	0.79	0.83	0.85	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.87	0.89	0.90	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.83	0.81	0.83
Northern EZ	0.80	0.83	0.85	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.83	0.82	0.84	0.85	0.87	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.80	0.79	0.80	0.81
Southern EZ	0.74	0.76	0.78	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.76	0.71	0.61	0.52	0.51	0.54	0.58	0.63

Table 24A. ESI with PCA, min-max and linear aggregation. Ranking

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	8	7	7	7	7	7	8
Germany	2	3	3	3	4	5	4	7	5	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ireland	7	7	4	6	7	4	5	8	9	9	10	11	11	11	10	9	9	9	9
Greece	8	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	8	8	7	7	10	10	11	11	10	11	11
Spain	10	9	9	9	10	10	10	6	7	7	8	9	9	9	9	10	11	10	10
France	5	6	7	7	6	6	7	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Italy	9	8	8	8	8	8	6	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	3	2	2	1	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	1	3	2	4	4	4	4	4
Austria	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2
Portugal	4	4	5	5	5	7	8	10	10	10	9	8	7	8	8	8	8	8	7
Finland	6	5	6	4	3	3	2	2	3	2	4	4	4	4	2	2	3	3	3

Table 25A. ESI with PCA, z-score and linear aggregation

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-1.00	-0.60	-0.31	-0.16	-0.41	-0.59	-0.66	-0.66	-0.69	-0.53	-0.35	-0.66	-0.65	-0.49	-0.60	-0.94	-1.09	-1.03	-0.79
Germany	0.65	0.69	0.74	0.84	0.79	0.60	0.59	0.53	0.62	0.83	1.02	0.79	0.80	1.03	1.17	1.19	1.24	1.35	1.45
Ireland	-0.50	0.05	0.46	0.49	0.38	0.38	0.27	0.14	0.08	0.01	-0.43	-2.50	-3.20	-3.64	-3.73	-2.98	-2.81	-1.92	-1.41
Greece	-0.02	-0.11	0.02	0.30	0.45	0.59	0.49	0.59	0.57	0.44	0.43	-0.19	-0.89	-2.50	-3.56	-2.97	-2.66	-2.43	-1.93
Spain	-0.68	-0.39	-0.17	0.04	0.08	0.16	0.11	0.38	0.45	0.40	0.22	-0.58	-1.01	-1.72	-2.66	-3.12	-2.97	-2.46	-1.94
France	-0.01	0.20	0.36	0.53	0.46	0.45	0.42	0.51	0.51	0.55	0.50	-0.18	-0.24	-0.37	-0.64	-0.82	-0.74	-0.59	-0.38
Italy	-0.15	0.01	0.18	0.38	0.49	0.56	0.55	0.60	0.63	0.70	0.71	0.44	0.30	0.28	0.00	-0.21	-0.24	-0.09	-0.02
Netherlands	0.38	0.59	0.62	1.07	0.92	0.72	0.50	0.46	0.70	0.83	0.90	0.75	0.57	0.64	0.38	-0.17	-0.43	-0.30	-0.04
Austria	0.87	0.95	1.07	1.07	1.00	0.86	0.74	0.69	0.70	0.75	1.01	0.54	0.62	0.59	0.34	0.21	0.31	0.36	0.41
Portugal	0.38	0.50	0.50	0.69	0.56	0.47	0.33	0.22	0.15	0.10	0.10	-0.32	-0.53	-0.93	-1.52	-1.58	-1.19	-0.88	-0.60
Finland	0.10	0.38	0.51	0.74	0.72	0.62	0.52	0.47	0.58	0.74	0.87	0.47	0.41	0.52	0.54	0.40	0.32	0.16	0.31
Northern EZ	0.16	0.37	0.50	0.68	0.58	0.44	0.35	0.33	0.40	0.53	0.66	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.20	-0.02	-0.07	-0.01	0.16
Southern EZ	-0.12	0.00	0.13	0.35	0.40	0.44	0.37	0.45	0.45	0.41	0.37	-0.16	-0.53	-1.22	-1.94	-1.97	-1.76	-1.46	-1.12

Table 26A. ESI with PCA, z-score and linear aggregation. Ranking

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	10	8	7	6	7	7	8	8
Germany	2	2	2	3	3	4	2	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ireland	9	7	6	7	9	9	9	10	10	10	11	11	11	11	11	10	10	9	9
Greece	7	9	9	9	8	5	6	3	6	7	7	7	9	10	10	9	9	10	10
Spain	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	8	8	8	8	9	10	9	9	11	11	11	11
France	6	6	7	6	7	8	7	5	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6
Italy	8	8	8	8	6	6	3	2	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
Netherlands	4	3	3	1	2	2	5	7	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	4	5	5	5
Austria	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	2	3	4	3	3	2	2
Portugal	3	4	5	5	5	7	8	9	9	9	9	8	7	8	8	8	8	7	7
Finland	5	5	4	4	4	3	4	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	3	3

Table 27A. Median rank

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	-0.07	0.18	0.32	0.39	0.25	0.15	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.17	0.27	0.06	0.11	0.19	0.14	-0.05	-0.14	-0.09	0.06
Germany	0.74	0.76	0.79	0.85	0.83	0.71	0.74	0.71	0.79	0.88	0.96	0.88	0.88	0.97	1.05	1.07	1.10	1.15	1.21
Ireland	0.17	0.47	0.71	0.72	0.66	0.65	0.57	0.47	0.44	0.39	0.17	-0.93	-1.26	-1.49	-1.52	-1.07	-0.97	-0.40	-0.20
Greece	0.34	0.29	0.36	0.52	0.61	0.69	0.63	0.69	0.68	0.60	0.60	0.25	-0.15	-1.06	-1.64	-1.32	-1.14	-1.00	-0.72
Spain	-0.02	0.15	0.28	0.39	0.41	0.46	0.43	0.59	0.62	0.60	0.49	0.04	-0.20	-0.60	-1.13	-1.39	-1.30	-1.01	-0.71
France	0.38	0.50	0.59	0.68	0.64	0.64	0.62	0.67	0.67	0.69	0.66	0.28	0.25	0.18	0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.06	0.18
Italy	0.29	0.37	0.47	0.58	0.65	0.68	0.68	0.71	0.73	0.77	0.77	0.62	0.54	0.53	0.37	0.25	0.24	0.32	0.38
Netherlands	0.64	0.76	0.77	1.00	0.91	0.86	0.76	0.74	0.88	0.90	0.90	0.89	0.81	0.87	0.75	0.44	0.28	0.36	0.50
Austria	0.87	0.92	0.99	0.99	0.95	0.89	0.84	0.82	0.83	0.86	0.96	0.72	0.77	0.74	0.60	0.52	0.59	0.62	0.66
Portugal	0.59	0.66	0.65	0.76	0.69	0.63	0.56	0.49	0.45	0.42	0.42	0.19	0.07	-0.16	-0.49	-0.48	-0.27	-0.08	0.08
Finland	0.45	0.62	0.74	0.87	0.86	0.76	0.72	0.67	0.75	0.84	0.89	0.66	0.63	0.68	0.68	0.61	0.56	0.48	0.56
Northern EZ	0.50	0.62	0.70	0.80	0.74	0.67	0.63	0.62	0.67	0.72	0.78	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.54	0.42	0.39	0.43	0.53
Southern EZ	0.30	0.37	0.44	0.56	0.59	0.62	0.58	0.62	0.62	0.60	0.57	0.28	0.06	-0.32	-0.72	-0.73	-0.62	-0.44	-0.24

Table 28A. Median rank. Ranking

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Belgium	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	10	8	7	6	7	7	8	8
Germany	2	3	3	4	4	5	4	5	4	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ireland	8	7	5	6	7	5	7	9	9	9	11	11	11	11	10	9	9	9	9
Greece	8	10	10	10	9	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	10	10	11	11	10	11	11
Spain	11	11	10	11	10	10	10	8	8	7	8	10	10	9	9	11	11	11	11
France	6	6	7	6	7	7	7	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6
Italy	9	8	8	8	7	7	6	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	3	2	3	1	2	2	3	3	1	1	3	1	3	2	3	4	4	4	4
Austria	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	2	2	2
Portugal	4	5	6	6	6	8	8	10	10	10	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7
Finland	5	5	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	3	3	3

Source tables 14A to 28A: Own elaboration. ESI Database of Annex 1.

Annex 4. Correlation results

Linear correlations

Table 29A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Belgium

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	0.040	0.043	0.070	0.066	0.044
EW MIN MAX	0.040	**1**	**0.995**	**0.979**	**0.996**	**0.997**
EW ZSCORE	0.043	**0.995**	**1**	**0.957**	**0.990**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	0.070	**0.979**	**0.957**	**1**	**0.985**	**0.964**
PCA ZSCORE	0.066	**0.996**	**0.990**	**0.985**	**1**	**0.993**
Median rank lineal	0.044	**0.997**	**1.000**	**0.964**	**0.993**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.111	-0.032	-0.203	-0.094	-0.051
EW MIN MAX	-0.111	**1**	**0.989**	**0.975**	**0.994**	**0.993**
EW ZSCORE	-0.032	**0.989**	**1**	**0.939**	**0.990**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	-0.203	**0.975**	**0.939**	**1**	**0.976**	**0.951**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.094	**0.994**	**0.990**	**0.976**	**1**	**0.994**
Median rank lineal	-0.051	**0.993**	**0.999**	**0.951**	**0.994**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	0.504	0.498	0.503	0.513	0.500
EW MIN MAX	0.504	**1**	**0.999**	**0.992**	**0.996**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	0.498	**0.999**	**1**	**0.986**	**0.991**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	0.503	**0.992**	**0.986**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.988**
PCA ZSCORE	0.513	**0.996**	**0.991**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.992**
Median rank lineal	0.500	**0.999**	**1.000**	**0.988**	**0.992**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 30A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Germany

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.760**	**-0.744**	**-0.785**	**-0.773**	**-0.764**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.760**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.989**	**0.986**	**0.997**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.744**	**0.996**	**1**	**0.982**	**0.986**	**0.996**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.785**	**0.989**	**0.982**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.991**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.773**	**0.986**	**0.986**	**0.996**	**1**	**0.991**
Median rank lineal	**-0.764**	**0.997**	**0.996**	**0.991**	**0.991**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.781**	**-0.705**	**-0.888**	**-0.875**	**-0.804**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.781**	**1**	**0.989**	**0.861**	**0.892**	**0.974**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.705**	**0.989**	**1**	**0.789**	**0.833**	**0.960**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.888**	**0.861**	**0.789**	**1**	**0.995**	**0.898**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.875**	**0.892**	**0.833**	**0.995**	**1**	**0.931**
Median rank lineal	**-0.804**	**0.974**	**0.960**	**0.898**	**0.931**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.373	-0.380	-0.389	-0.399	-0.374
EW MIN MAX	-0.373	**1**	**0.992**	**1.000**	**0.993**	**0.996**
EW ZSCORE	-0.380	**0.992**	**1**	**0.990**	**1.000**	**0.994**
PCA MINMAX	-0.389	**1.000**	**0.990**	**1**	**0.991**	**0.995**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.399	**0.993**	**1.000**	**0.991**	**1**	**0.995**
Median rank lineal	-0.374	**0.996**	**0.994**	**0.995**	**0.995**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 31A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Ireland

Ireland
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.919**	**-0.912**	**-0.918**	**-0.913**	**-0.914**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.919**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.997**	**0.998**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.912**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.997**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.918**	**0.997**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.995**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.913**	**0.998**	**0.997**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.998**
Median rank lineal	**-0.914**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**0.995**	**0.998**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.303	-0.245	-0.445	-0.355	-0.261
EW MIN MAX	-0.303	**1**	**0.991**	**0.981**	**0.990**	**0.992**
EW ZSCORE	-0.245	**0.991**	**1**	**0.958**	**0.990**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	-0.445	**0.981**	**0.958**	**1**	**0.985**	**0.962**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.355	**0.990**	**0.990**	**0.985**	**1**	**0.992**
Median rank lineal	-0.261	**0.992**	**1.000**	**0.962**	**0.992**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.837**	**-0.818**	**-0.825**	**-0.811**	**-0.822**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.837**	**1**	**0.997**	**0.989**	**0.993**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.818**	**0.997**	**1**	**0.979**	**0.989**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.825**	**0.989**	**0.979**	**1**	**0.997**	**0.983**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.811**	**0.993**	**0.989**	**0.997**	**1**	**0.992**
Median rank lineal	**-0.822**	**0.998**	**1.000**	**0.983**	**0.992**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 32A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Greece

Greece
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.959**	**-0.957**	**-0.959**	**-0.959**	**-0.959**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.959**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.957**	**0.998**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.959**	**0.999**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.998**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.959**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.959**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.362	-0.265	-0.447	-0.384	-0.382
EW MIN MAX	-0.362	**1**	**0.986**	**0.983**	**0.998**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	-0.265	**0.986**	**1**	**0.939**	**0.976**	**0.977**
PCA MINMAX	-0.447	**0.983**	**0.939**	**1**	**0.991**	**0.991**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.384	**0.998**	**0.976**	**0.991**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	-0.382	**0.999**	**0.977**	**0.991**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.959**	**-0.955**	**-0.960**	**-0.956**	**-0.957**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.959**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.955**	**0.998**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.960**	**0.999**	**0.996**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.999**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.956**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.957**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 33A. L Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Spain

Spain
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.982**	**-0.983**	**-0.980**	**-0.982**	**-0.982**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.982**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.983**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.980**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.999**	**1.000**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.982**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**0.999**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.982**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.410	-0.397	-0.451	-0.436	-0.433
EW MIN MAX	-0.410	**1**	**0.998**	**0.997**	**0.998**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	-0.397	**0.998**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.997**	**0.998**
PCA MINMAX	-0.451	**0.997**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.436	**0.998**	**0.997**	**0.999**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	-0.433	**0.998**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.985**	**-0.985**	**-0.987**	**-0.987**	**-0.987**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.985**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.985**	**0.999**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.987**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.999**	**1.000**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.987**	**0.998**	**1.000**	**0.999**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.987**	**0.998**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 34A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: France

France
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.532**	**-0.513**	**-0.530**	**-0.514**	**-0.516**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.532**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**0.999**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.513**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.998**	**1.000**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.530**	**0.999**	**0.998**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.514**	**0.998**	**1.000**	**0.999**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.516**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.097	0.084	-0.067	0.090	0.072
EW MIN MAX	-0.097	**1**	**0.939**	**0.992**	**0.923**	**0.937**
EW ZSCORE	0.084	**0.939**	**1**	**0.967**	**0.998**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	-0.067	**0.992**	**0.967**	**1**	**0.959**	**0.969**
PCA ZSCORE	0.090	**0.923**	**0.998**	**0.959**	**1**	**0.999**
Median rank lineal	0.072	**0.937**	**0.999**	**0.969**	**0.999**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.471	-0.460	-0.478	-0.472	-0.471
EW MIN MAX	-0.471	**1**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1.000**
EW ZSCORE	-0.460	**0.999**	**1**	**0.997**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	-0.478	**0.999**	**0.997**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.472	**1.000**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	-0.471	**1.000**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 35A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Italy

Italy
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.736**	**-0.688**	**-0.749**	**-0.703**	**-0.708**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.736**	**1**	**0.990**	**0.997**	**0.992**	**0.994**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.688**	**0.990**	**1**	**0.980**	**0.997**	**0.997**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.749**	**0.997**	**0.980**	**1**	**0.988**	**0.990**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.703**	**0.992**	**0.997**	**0.988**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.708**	**0.994**	**0.997**	**0.990**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.670**	-0.628	**-0.677**	-0.637	-0.642
EW MIN MAX	**-0.670**	**1**	**0.995**	**0.999**	**0.997**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	-0.628	**0.995**	**1**	**0.992**	**0.999**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.677**	**0.999**	**0.992**	**1**	**0.995**	**0.996**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.637	**0.997**	**0.999**	**0.995**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	-0.642	**0.998**	**0.999**	**0.996**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.781**	**-0.744**	**-0.793**	**-0.760**	**-0.763**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.781**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.997**	**0.996**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.744**	**0.996**	**1**	**0.989**	**0.996**	**0.997**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.793**	**0.997**	**0.989**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.997**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.760**	**0.996**	**0.996**	**0.996**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	**-0.763**	**0.998**	**0.997**	**0.997**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 36A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Netherlands

Netherlands
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.040	-0.021	-0.004	0.011	0.000
EW MIN MAX	-0.040	**1**	**0.999**	**0.991**	**0.992**	**0.996**
EW ZSCORE	-0.021	**0.999**	**1**	**0.989**	**0.992**	**0.997**
PCA MINMAX	-0.004	**0.991**	**0.989**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.986**
PCA ZSCORE	0.011	**0.992**	**0.992**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.989**
Median rank lineal	0.000	**0.996**	**0.997**	**0.986**	**0.989**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.107	-0.077	-0.050	-0.030	-0.021
EW MIN MAX	-0.107	**1**	**0.992**	**0.963**	**0.978**	**0.988**
EW ZSCORE	-0.077	**0.992**	**1**	**0.935**	**0.962**	**0.994**
PCA MINMAX	-0.050	**0.963**	**0.935**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.933**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.030	**0.978**	**0.962**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.960**
Median rank lineal	-0.021	**0.988**	**0.994**	**0.933**	**0.960**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.347	-0.330	-0.348	-0.331	-0.321
EW MIN MAX	-0.347	**1**	**1.000**	**0.996**	**0.997**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	-0.330	**1.000**	**1**	**0.995**	**0.997**	**0.998**
PCA MINMAX	-0.348	**0.996**	**0.995**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.991**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.331	**0.997**	**0.997**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.992**
Median rank lineal	-0.321	**0.998**	**0.998**	**0.991**	**0.992**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 37A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Austria

Austria
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.327	-0.266	-0.273	-0.232	-0.257
EW MIN MAX	-0.327	**1**	**0.991**	**0.989**	**0.984**	**0.983**
EW ZSCORE	-0.266	**0.991**	**1**	**0.983**	**0.994**	**0.997**
PCA MINMAX	-0.273	**0.989**	**0.983**	**1**	**0.992**	**0.982**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.232	**0.984**	**0.994**	**0.992**	**1**	**0.996**
Median rank lineal	-0.257	**0.983**	**0.997**	**0.982**	**0.996**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	0.424	0.530	0.513	0.581	0.553
EW MIN MAX	0.424	**1**	**0.987**	**0.970**	**0.954**	**0.976**
EW ZSCORE	0.530	**0.987**	**1**	**0.978**	**0.980**	**0.991**
PCA MINMAX	0.513	**0.970**	**0.978**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.990**
PCA ZSCORE	0.581	**0.954**	**0.980**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.991**
Median rank lineal	0.553	**0.976**	**0.991**	**0.990**	**0.991**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.618	-0.561	-0.646	-0.593	-0.576
EW MIN MAX	-0.618	**1**	**0.993**	**0.997**	**0.996**	**0.989**
EW ZSCORE	-0.561	**0.993**	**1**	**0.984**	**0.998**	**0.997**
PCA MINMAX	-0.646	**0.997**	**0.984**	**1**	**0.992**	**0.983**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.593	**0.996**	**0.998**	**0.992**	**1**	**0.997**
Median rank lineal	-0.576	**0.989**	**0.997**	**0.983**	**0.997**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 38A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Portugal

Portugal
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.737**	**-0.724**	**-0.725**	**-0.715**	**-0.721**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.737**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.995**	**0.996**	**0.998**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.724**	**0.998**	**1**	**0.991**	**0.995**	**0.997**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.725**	**0.995**	**0.991**	**1**	**0.999**	**0.998**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.715**	**0.996**	**0.995**	**0.999**	**1**	**0.999**
Median rank lineal	**-0.721**	**0.998**	**0.997**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.293	-0.172	-0.344	-0.243	-0.250
EW MIN MAX	-0.293	**1**	**0.989**	**0.996**	**0.993**	**0.995**
EW ZSCORE	-0.172	**0.989**	**1**	**0.979**	**0.994**	**0.994**
PCA MINMAX	-0.344	**0.996**	**0.979**	**1**	**0.992**	**0.993**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.243	**0.993**	**0.994**	**0.992**	**1**	**1.000**
Median rank lineal	-0.250	**0.995**	**0.994**	**0.993**	**1.000**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	**-0.813**	**-0.807**	**-0.747**	**-0.749**	**-0.766**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.813**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.985**	**0.990**	**0.996**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.807**	**0.996**	**1**	**0.970**	**0.981**	**0.991**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.747**	**0.985**	**0.970**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.993**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.749**	**0.990**	**0.981**	**0.998**	**1**	**0.998**
Median rank lineal	**-0.766**	**0.996**	**0.991**	**0.993**	**0.998**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 39A. Linear correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Finland

Finland
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	0.068	0.137	-0.055	0.065	0.128
EW MIN MAX	0.068	**1**	**0.988**	**0.975**	**0.978**	**0.990**
EW ZSCORE	0.137	**0.988**	**1**	**0.955**	**0.987**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	-0.055	**0.975**	**0.955**	**1**	**0.980**	**0.956**
PCA ZSCORE	0.065	**0.978**	**0.987**	**0.980**	**1**	**0.985**
Median rank lineal	0.128	**0.990**	**0.999**	**0.956**	**0.985**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	-0.164	0.088	-0.333	-0.011	0.061
EW MIN MAX	-0.164	**1**	**0.967**	**0.971**	**0.979**	**0.974**
EW ZSCORE	0.088	**0.967**	**1**	**0.892**	**0.985**	**1.000**
PCA MINMAX	-0.333	**0.971**	**0.892**	**1**	**0.944**	**0.904**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.011	**0.979**	**0.985**	**0.944**	**1**	**0.987**
Median rank lineal	0.061	**0.974**	**1.000**	**0.904**	**0.987**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Pearson):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal
EB	**1**	0.181	0.077	0.119	0.029	0.078
EW MIN MAX	0.181	**1**	**0.992**	**0.996**	**0.986**	**0.993**
EW ZSCORE	0.077	**0.992**	**1**	**0.993**	**0.997**	**0.999**
PCA MINMAX	0.119	**0.996**	**0.993**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.996**
PCA ZSCORE	0.029	**0.986**	**0.997**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.998**
Median rank lineal	0.078	**0.993**	**0.999**	**0.996**	**0.998**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 40A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Belgium

Belgium
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	-0.026	-0.026	-0.071	-0.071	-0.071	-0.202	-0.193	-0.392	-0.232	-0.196	-0.119
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.026	**1**	**1.000**	**0.993**	**0.993**	**0.995**	**0.930**	**0.953**	0.854	0.896	**0.942**	**0.982**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.026	**1.000**	**1**	**0.993**	**0.993**	**0.995**	**0.930**	**0.953**	0.854	0.896	**0.942**	**0.982**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.071	**0.993**	**0.993**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.998**	**0.937**	**0.962**	0.854	0.909	**0.956**	**0.983**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.071	**0.993**	**0.993**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.998**	**0.937**	**0.962**	0.854	0.909	**0.956**	**0.983**
Median rank ordinal	-0.071	**0.995**	**0.995**	**0.998**	**0.998**	**1**	**0.943**	**0.962**	0.854	0.897	**0.952**	**0.990**
EW MIN MAX	-0.202	**0.930**	**0.930**	**0.937**	**0.937**	**0.943**	**1**	**0.968**	0.885	0.884	**0.964**	**0.959**
EW ZSCORE	-0.193	**0.953**	**0.953**	**0.962**	**0.962**	**0.962**	**0.968**	**1**	0.907	0.930	**0.989**	**0.961**
PCA MINMAX	-0.392	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.885	0.907	**1**	0.950	0.916	0.868
PCA ZSCORE	-0.232	0.896	0.896	0.909	0.909	0.897	0.884	0.930	0.950	**1**	0.953	0.875
Median rank lineal	-0.196	**0.942**	**0.942**	**0.956**	**0.956**	**0.952**	**0.964**	**0.989**	0.916	0.953	**1**	**0.949**
Median rank total	-0.119	**0.982**	**0.982**	**0.983**	**0.983**	**0.990**	**0.959**	**0.961**	0.868	0.875	**0.949**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.000	0.000	-0.038	-0.038	-0.038	-0.164	-0.149	-0.341	-0.169	-0.139	-0.091
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.000	**1**	**1.000**	**0.963**	**0.963**	**0.977**	**0.840**	**0.880**	**0.719**	**0.795**	**0.852**	**0.929**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.000	**1.000**	**1**	**0.963**	**0.963**	**0.977**	**0.840**	**0.880**	**0.719**	**0.795**	**0.852**	**0.929**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.038	**0.963**	**0.963**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.987**	**0.828**	**0.881**	**0.711**	**0.799**	**0.867**	**0.940**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.038	**0.963**	**0.963**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.987**	**0.828**	**0.881**	**0.711**	**0.799**	**0.867**	**0.940**
Median rank ordinal	-0.038	**0.977**	**0.977**	**0.987**	**0.987**	**1**	**0.843**	**0.881**	**0.711**	**0.784**	**0.853**	**0.954**
EW MIN MAX	-0.164	**0.840**	**0.840**	**0.828**	**0.828**	**0.843**	**1**	**0.919**	**0.807**	**0.811**	**0.897**	**0.880**
EW ZSCORE	-0.149	**0.880**	**0.880**	**0.881**	**0.881**	**0.881**	**0.919**	**1**	**0.838**	**0.880**	**0.961**	**0.881**
PCA MINMAX	-0.341	**0.719**	**0.719**	**0.711**	**0.711**	**0.711**	**0.807**	**0.838**	**1**	**0.910**	**0.852**	**0.735**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.169	**0.795**	**0.795**	**0.799**	**0.799**	**0.784**	**0.811**	**0.880**	**0.910**	**1**	**0.916**	**0.760**
Median rank lineal	-0.139	**0.852**	**0.852**	**0.867**	**0.867**	**0.853**	**0.897**	**0.961**	**0.852**	**0.916**	**1**	**0.846**
Median rank total	-0.091	**0.929**	**0.929**	**0.940**	**0.940**	**0.954**	**0.880**	**0.881**	**0.735**	**0.760**	**0.846**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.382	0.382	0.212	0.212	0.212	0.144	0.144			0.144	0.212
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.382	**1**	**1.000**	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.756**	**0.756**			**0.756**	**0.970**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.382	**1.000**	**1**	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.756**	**0.756**			**0.756**	**0.970**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.212	**0.970**	**0.970**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.825**	**0.825**			**0.825**	**1.000**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.212	**0.970**	**0.970**	**1.000**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.825**	**0.825**			**0.825**	**1.000**
Median rank ordinal	0.212	**0.970**	**0.970**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.825**	**0.825**			**0.825**	**1.000**
EW MIN MAX	0.144	**0.756**	**0.756**	**0.825**	**0.825**	**0.825**	**1**	**1.000**			**1.000**	**0.825**
EW ZSCORE	0.144	**0.756**	**0.756**	**0.825**	**0.825**	**0.825**	**1.000**	**1**			**1.000**	**0.825**
PCA MINMAX												
PCA ZSCORE												
Median rank lineal	0.144	**0.756**	**0.756**	**0.825**	**0.825**	**0.825**	**1.000**	**1.000**			**1**	**0.825**
Median rank total	0.212	**0.970**	**0.970**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.825**	**0.825**			**0.825**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.311	0.311	0.160	0.160	0.160	0.134	0.134	**0.134**	**0.134**	0.134	0.160
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.311	**1**	**1.000**	**0.926**	**0.926**	**0.926**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.926**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.311	**1.000**	**1**	**0.926**	**0.926**	**0.926**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.926**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.160	**0.926**	**0.926**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.160	**0.926**	**0.926**	**1.000**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**
Median rank ordinal	0.160	**0.926**	**0.926**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**
EW MIN MAX	0.134	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.717**
EW ZSCORE	0.134	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.717**
PCA MINMAX	**0.134**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
PCA ZSCORE	**0.134**	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.000**	**0**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Median rank lineal	0.134	**0.689**	**0.689**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**1**	**0.717**
Median rank total	0.160	**0.926**	**0.926**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.717**	**0.717**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.717**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.273	0.273	0.251	0.251	0.251	-0.132	-0.105	-0.585	-0.126	-0.178	0.218
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.273	**1**	**1.000**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**0.806**	**0.819**	0.458	0.711	0.725	**0.970**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.273	**1.000**	**1**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**0.806**	**0.819**	0.458	0.711	0.725	**0.970**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.251	**0.988**	**0.988**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.837**	**0.840**	0.494	**0.758**	**0.772**	**0.988**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.251	**0.988**	**0.988**	**1.000**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.837**	**0.840**	0.494	**0.758**	**0.772**	**0.988**
Median rank ordinal	0.251	**0.988**	**0.988**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.837**	**0.840**	0.494	**0.758**	**0.772**	**0.988**
EW MIN MAX	-0.132	**0.806**	**0.806**	**0.837**	**0.837**	**0.837**	**1**	**0.816**	**0.813**	**0.892**	**0.900**	**0.878**
EW ZSCORE	-0.105	**0.819**	**0.819**	**0.840**	**0.840**	**0.840**	**0.816**	**1**	**0.773**	**0.911**	**0.918**	**0.821**
PCA MINMAX	-0.585	0.458	0.458	0.494	0.494	0.494	**0.813**	**0.773**	**1**	**0.849**	**0.858**	0.549
PCA ZSCORE	-0.126	0.711	0.711	**0.758**	**0.758**	**0.758**	**0.892**	**0.911**	**0.849**	**1**	**0.994**	**0.783**
Median rank lineal	-0.178	0.725	0.725	**0.772**	**0.772**	**0.772**	**0.900**	**0.918**	**0.858**	**0.994**	**1**	**0.790**
Median rank total	0.218	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**0.878**	**0.821**	0.549	**0.783**	**0.790**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.313	0.313	0.270	0.270	0.270	-0.087	-0.036	-0.440	-0.037	-0.071	0.169
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.313	**1**	**1.000**	**0.971**	**0.971**	**0.971**	**0.722**	**0.782**	0.453	**0.679**	**0.677**	**0.883**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.313	**1.000**	**1**	**0.971**	**0.971**	**0.971**	**0.722**	**0.782**	0.453	**0.679**	**0.677**	**0.883**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.270	**0.971**	**0.971**	**1**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.738**	**0.789**	0.473	**0.691**	**0.687**	**0.914**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.270	**0.971**	**0.971**	**1.000**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.738**	**0.789**	0.473	**0.691**	**0.687**	**0.914**
Median rank ordinal	0.270	**0.971**	**0.971**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.738**	**0.789**	0.473	**0.691**	**0.687**	**0.914**
EW MIN MAX	-0.087	**0.722**	**0.722**	**0.738**	**0.738**	**0.738**	**1**	**0.745**	**0.742**	**0.810**	**0.810**	**0.775**
EW ZSCORE	-0.036	**0.782**	**0.782**	**0.789**	**0.789**	**0.789**	**0.745**	**1**	**0.754**	**0.867**	**0.889**	**0.789**
PCA MINMAX	-0.440	0.453	0.453	0.473	0.473	0.473	**0.742**	**0.754**	**1**	**0.817**	**0.849**	0.575
PCA ZSCORE	-0.037	**0.679**	**0.679**	**0.691**	**0.691**	**0.691**	**0.810**	**0.867**	**0.817**	**1**	**0.952**	**0.722**
Median rank lineal	-0.071	**0.677**	**0.677**	**0.687**	**0.687**	**0.687**	**0.810**	**0.889**	**0.849**	**0.952**	**1**	**0.777**
Median rank total	0.169	**0.883**	**0.883**	**0.914**	**0.914**	**0.914**	**0.775**	**0.789**	0.575	**0.722**	**0.777**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 41A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Germany

Germany
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.91**	**-0.91**	**-0.94**	**-0.94**	**-0.94**	**-0.88**	**-0.74**	**-0.92**	**-0.76**	**-0.87**	**-0.92**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.91**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.84**	**0.94**	**0.83**	**0.93**	**0.98**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.91**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.84**	**0.94**	**0.83**	**0.93**	**0.98**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.94**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.80**	**0.94**	**0.79**	**0.91**	**0.98**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.94**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.80**	**0.94**	**0.79**	**0.91**	**0.98**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.94**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.82**	**0.94**	**0.81**	**0.92**	**0.99**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.88**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.92**	**0.88**	**0.94**	**0.94**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.74**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.82**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.83**	**0.89**	**0.93**	**0.82**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.92**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.92**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.83**	**0.97**	**0.93**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.76**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.81**	**0.88**	**0.89**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.86**
Median rank lineal	**-0.87**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.92**	**0.94**	**0.93**	**0.97**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**0.93**
Median rank total	**-0.92**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.99**	**0.94**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.86**	**0.93**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.81**	**-0.81**	**-0.85**	**-0.85**	**-0.83**	**-0.77**	**-0.59**	**-0.84**	**-0.67**	**-0.76**	**-0.82**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.81**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.97**	**0.80**	**0.68**	**0.84**	**0.71**	**0.81**	**0.93**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.81**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.97**	**0.80**	**0.68**	**0.84**	**0.71**	**0.81**	**0.93**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.85**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.76**	**0.63**	**0.85**	**0.67**	**0.77**	**0.92**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.85**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.76**	**0.63**	**0.85**	**0.67**	**0.77**	**0.92**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.83**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.65**	**0.84**	**0.69**	**0.79**	**0.93**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.77**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.74**	**0.85**	**0.78**	**0.88**	**0.84**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.59**	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.65**	**0.74**	**1.00**	**0.72**	**0.80**	**0.85**	**0.66**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.84**	**0.85**	**0.72**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.91**	**0.84**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.67**	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.69**	**0.78**	**0.80**	**0.77**	**1.00**	**0.86**	**0.73**
Median rank lineal	**-0.76**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.79**	**0.88**	**0.85**	**0.91**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.82**
Median rank total	**-0.82**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.93**	**0.84**	**0.66**	**0.84**	**0.73**	**0.82**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.89**	**-0.89**	**-0.91**	**-0.91**	**-0.91**	-0.66	0.17	**-0.79**	-0.59	-0.63	**-0.96**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.89**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	0.42	0.03	**0.76**	0.51	0.65	**0.87**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.89**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	0.42	0.03	**0.76**	0.51	0.65	**0.87**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.91**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.47	0.03	**0.80**	0.57	0.70	**0.90**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.91**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.47	0.03	**0.80**	0.57	0.70	**0.90**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.91**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.47	0.03	**0.80**	0.57	0.70	**0.90**
EW MIN MAX	-0.66	0.42	0.42	0.47	0.47	0.47	**1.00**	-0.14	0.54	0.47	0.49	0.63
EW ZSCORE	0.17	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.14	**1.00**	0.12	0.41	0.46	-0.04
PCA MINMAX	**-0.79**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.80**	0.54	0.12	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.92**	**0.84**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.59	0.51	0.51	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.41	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.76**
Median rank lineal	-0.63	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.49	0.46	**0.92**	**0.89**	**1.00**	0.72
Median rank total	**-0.96**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	0.63	-0.04	**0.84**	**0.76**	0.72	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.67**	**-0.67**	**-0.82**	**-0.82**	**-0.76**	-0.39	0.19	**-0.70**	-0.28	-0.36	**-0.69**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.67**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.93**	0.42	0.13	**0.63**	0.50	0.53	**0.76**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.67**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.93**	0.42	0.13	**0.63**	0.50	0.53	**0.76**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.82**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	0.31	0.00	**0.71**	0.40	0.44	**0.67**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.82**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	0.31	0.00	**0.71**	0.40	0.44	**0.67**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.76**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**1.00**	0.38	0.07	**0.65**	0.46	0.49	**0.72**
EW MIN MAX	-0.39	0.42	0.42	0.31	0.31	0.38	**1.00**	0.15	0.42	0.56	0.56	**0.63**
EW ZSCORE	0.19	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.15	**1.00**	0.11	0.51	0.55	0.13
PCA MINMAX	**-0.70**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.65**	0.42	0.11	**1.00**	0.55	**0.71**	**0.65**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.28	0.50	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.46	0.56	0.51	0.55	**1.00**	**0.84**	**0.65**
Median rank lineal	-0.36	0.53	0.53	0.44	0.44	0.49	0.56	0.55	**0.71**	**0.84**	**1.00**	**0.61**
Median rank total	**-0.69**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.72**	**0.63**	0.13	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.61**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.67**	**-0.67**	**-0.73**	**-0.73**	**-0.73**	**-0.69**	-0.41	**-0.69**		**-0.67**	**-0.73**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.67**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.82**	0.62	**0.82**		**0.82**	**0.99**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.67**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.82**	0.62	**0.82**		**0.82**	**0.99**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.73**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.81**	0.61	**0.82**		**0.81**	**1.00**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.73**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.81**	0.61	**0.82**		**0.81**	**1.00**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.73**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.81**	0.61	**0.82**		**0.81**	**1.00**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.69**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**1.00**	**0.70**	**1.00**		**0.99**	**0.81**
EW ZSCORE	-0.41	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.61	**0.70**	**1.00**	**0.75**		**0.81**	0.61
PCA MINMAX	**-0.69**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.75**	**1.00**		**1.00**	**0.82**
PCA ZSCORE												
Median rank lineal	**-0.67**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.99**	**0.81**	**1.00**		**1.00**	**0.81**
Median rank total	**-0.73**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.81**	0.61	**0.82**		**0.81**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.47	-0.47	-0.52	-0.52	-0.52	-0.50	-0.07	-0.50	**-0.50**	-0.46	-0.52
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.47	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.67**	0.37	**0.67**	**0.67**	0.65	**0.97**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.47	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.67**	0.37	**0.67**	**0.67**	0.65	**0.97**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.52	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.65**	0.36	**0.65**	**0.65**	0.63	**1.00**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.52	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.65**	0.36	**0.65**	**0.65**	0.63	**1.00**
Median rank ordinal	-0.52	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.65**	0.36	**0.65**	**0.65**	0.63	**1.00**
EW MIN MAX	-0.50	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**1.00**	0.55	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.65**
EW ZSCORE	-0.07	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.55	**1.00**	0.55	**0.55**	0.66	0.36
PCA MINMAX	-0.50	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**1.00**	0.55	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.65**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.50**	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**1.00**	**0.55**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
Median rank lineal	-0.46	0.65	0.65	0.63	0.63	0.63	**0.97**	0.66	**0.97**	**0.00**	**1.00**	0.63
Median rank total	-0.52	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.65**	0.36	**0.65**	**0.00**	0.63	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 42A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Ireland

Ireland
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.69**	**-0.69**	**-0.77**	**-0.77**	**-0.77**	**-0.79**	**-0.72**	**-0.76**	**-0.66**	**-0.76**	**-0.83**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.69**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.88**	**0.93**	**0.91**	**0.94**	**0.91**	**0.92**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.69**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.88**	**0.93**	**0.91**	**0.94**	**0.91**	**0.92**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.77**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.97**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.77**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.97**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.77**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.97**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.79**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.98**	**0.86**	**0.99**	**0.98**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.72**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.93**	**0.98**	**0.95**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.76**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.98**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.99**	**0.96**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.66**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.86**	**0.93**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.87**
Median rank lineal	**-0.76**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.99**	**0.98**	**0.99**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**0.96**
Median rank total	**-0.83**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.98**	**0.95**	**0.96**	**0.87**	**0.96**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.53**	**-0.53**	**-0.60**	**-0.60**	**-0.60**	**-0.65**	**-0.60**	**-0.63**	**-0.54**	**-0.63**	**-0.66**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.53**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.76**	**0.82**	**0.81**	**0.86**	**0.81**	**0.84**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.53**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.76**	**0.82**	**0.81**	**0.86**	**0.81**	**0.84**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.60**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.84**	**0.91**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.60**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.84**	**0.91**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.60**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.84**	**0.91**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.65**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.94**	**0.74**	**0.96**	**0.92**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.60**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.87**	**0.93**	**0.86**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.63**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.94**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.96**	**0.87**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.54**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.74**	**0.87**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.81**	**0.75**
Median rank lineal	**-0.63**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.96**	**0.93**	**0.96**	**0.81**	**1.00**	**0.88**
Median rank total	**-0.66**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.92**	**0.86**	**0.87**	**0.75**	**0.88**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.22	-0.22	-0.27	-0.27	-0.27	-0.39	-0.38	-0.26	-0.05	-0.42	-0.37
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.22	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.81**	**0.88**	**0.97**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.22	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.81**	**0.88**	**0.97**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.85**	**0.84**	**0.79**	**0.89**	**0.98**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.85**	**0.84**	**0.79**	**0.89**	**0.98**
Median rank ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.85**	**0.84**	**0.79**	**0.89**	**0.98**
EW MIN MAX	-0.39	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.86**	**0.97**	**0.76**	**0.99**	**0.94**
EW ZSCORE	-0.38	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.88**	**0.91**	**0.91**
PCA MINMAX	-0.26	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.97**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.74**	**0.96**	**0.86**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.05	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.76**	**0.88**	**0.74**	**1.00**	**0.80**	**0.79**
Median rank lineal	-0.42	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.89**	**0.89**	**0.89**	**0.99**	**0.91**	**0.96**	**0.80**	**1.00**	**0.94**
Median rank total	-0.37	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.94**	**0.91**	**0.86**	**0.79**	**0.94**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.19	-0.19	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.36	-0.32	-0.23	-0.04	-0.38	-0.30
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.19	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.81**	**0.73**	**0.68**	**0.69**	**0.78**	**0.93**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.19	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.81**	**0.73**	**0.68**	**0.69**	**0.78**	**0.93**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.22	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**0.67**	**0.65**	**0.80**	**0.94**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.22	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**0.67**	**0.65**	**0.80**	**0.94**
Median rank ordinal	-0.22	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**0.67**	**0.65**	**0.80**	**0.94**
EW MIN MAX	-0.36	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.76**	**0.92**	**0.62**	**0.97**	**0.88**
EW ZSCORE	-0.32	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.76**	**1.00**	**0.66**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.81**
PCA MINMAX	-0.23	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.92**	**0.66**	**1.00**	**0.61**	**0.90**	**0.73**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.04	**0.69**	**0.69**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.62**	**0.80**	**0.61**	**1.00**	**0.67**	**0.65**
Median rank lineal	-0.38	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.97**	**0.80**	**0.90**	**0.67**	**1.00**	**0.86**
Median rank total	-0.30	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.88**	**0.81**	**0.73**	**0.65**	**0.86**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.45	-0.45	-0.46	-0.46	-0.46	-0.14	-0.14	-0.29	-0.49	-0.14	-0.46
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.45	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.94**	**0.91**	**0.87**	**0.99**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.45	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.94**	**0.91**	**0.87**	**0.99**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.46	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.94**	**0.90**	**0.87**	**1.00**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.46	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.94**	**0.90**	**0.87**	**1.00**
Median rank ordinal	-0.46	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.94**	**0.90**	**0.87**	**1.00**
EW MIN MAX	-0.14	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.87**
EW ZSCORE	-0.14	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.87**
PCA MINMAX	-0.29	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.95**	**0.94**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.49	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.90**
Median rank lineal	-0.14	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.87**
Median rank total	-0.46	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.94**	**0.90**	**0.87**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.32	-0.32	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-0.11	-0.11	-0.25	-0.42	-0.11	-0.34
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.32	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.87**	**0.84**	**0.77**	**0.97**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.32	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.87**	**0.84**	**0.77**	**0.97**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.34	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.85**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**1.00**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.34	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.85**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**1.00**
Median rank ordinal	-0.34	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.85**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**1.00**
EW MIN MAX	-0.11	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.75**
EW ZSCORE	-0.11	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.75**
PCA MINMAX	-0.25	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**0.80**	**0.92**	**0.85**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.42	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.80**	**1.00**	**0.83**	**0.82**
Median rank lineal	-0.11	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.75**
Median rank total	-0.34	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.85**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 43A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Greece

Greece
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.87**	**-0.87**	**-0.85**	**-0.85**	**-0.85**	**-0.79**	**-0.89**	**-0.78**	**-0.91**	**-0.84**	**-0.91**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.74**	**0.88**	**0.78**	**0.89**	**0.83**	**0.95**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.87**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.74**	**0.88**	**0.78**	**0.89**	**0.83**	**0.95**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.85**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.87**	**0.78**	**0.87**	**0.82**	**0.94**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.85**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.87**	**0.78**	**0.87**	**0.82**	**0.94**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.85**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.87**	**0.78**	**0.87**	**0.82**	**0.94**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.79**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**1.00**	**0.86**	**0.96**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.82**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.89**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.92**	**0.96**	**0.94**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.78**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.96**	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.83**	**0.97**	**0.84**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.91**	**0.89**	**0.89**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.82**	**0.92**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.98**
Median rank lineal	**-0.84**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.96**	**0.97**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**0.89**
Median rank total	**-0.91**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.82**	**0.94**	**0.84**	**0.98**	**0.89**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.77**	**-0.77**	**-0.73**	**-0.73**	**-0.73**	**-0.66**	**-0.83**	**-0.64**	**-0.84**	**-0.72**	**-0.81**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.77**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.60**	**0.78**	**0.65**	**0.78**	**0.72**	**0.86**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.77**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.60**	**0.78**	**0.65**	**0.78**	**0.72**	**0.86**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.73**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.59**	**0.74**	**0.64**	**0.75**	**0.69**	**0.84**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.73**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.59**	**0.74**	**0.64**	**0.75**	**0.69**	**0.84**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.73**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.59**	**0.74**	**0.64**	**0.75**	**0.69**	**0.84**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.66**	**0.60**	**0.60**	**0.59**	**0.59**	**0.59**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.93**	**0.69**	**0.87**	**0.66**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.83**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.80**	**0.85**	**0.91**	**0.84**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.64**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.64**	**0.64**	**0.64**	**0.93**	**0.80**	**1.00**	**0.67**	**0.93**	**0.67**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.84**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.69**	**0.85**	**0.67**	**1.00**	**0.74**	**0.93**
Median rank lineal	**-0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.69**	**0.69**	**0.69**	**0.87**	**0.91**	**0.93**	**0.74**	**1.00**	**0.75**
Median rank total	**-0.81**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.66**	**0.84**	**0.67**	**0.93**	**0.75**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.66	-0.66	-0.59	-0.59	-0.59	**-0.73**	**-0.70**	-0.48	**-0.73**	-0.61	-0.67
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.66	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.84**	**0.94**	**0.80**	**0.90**	**0.97**	**0.92**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.66	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.84**	**0.94**	**0.80**	**0.90**	**0.97**	**0.92**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.59	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.79**	**0.88**	**0.96**	**0.90**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.59	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.79**	**0.88**	**0.96**	**0.90**
Median rank ordinal	-0.59	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.79**	**0.88**	**0.96**	**0.90**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.73**	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.74**	**0.86**	**0.82**	**0.86**	**0.82**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.70**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.74**	**1.00**	0.66	**0.93**	**0.90**	**0.93**
PCA MINMAX	-0.48	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.86**	0.66	**1.00**	0.66	**0.91**	0.68
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.73**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.82**	**0.93**	0.66	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.99**
Median rank lineal	-0.61	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.86**	**0.90**	**0.91**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.87**
Median rank total	-0.67	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.82**	**0.93**	0.68	**0.99**	**0.87**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.58	-0.58	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	-0.67	-0.65	-0.39	**-0.64**	-0.54	-0.57
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.58	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.73**	**0.89**	**0.72**	**0.81**	**0.95**	**0.84**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.58	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.73**	**0.89**	**0.72**	**0.81**	**0.95**	**0.84**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.49	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.70**	**0.85**	**0.68**	**0.77**	**0.90**	**0.80**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.49	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.70**	**0.85**	**0.68**	**0.77**	**0.90**	**0.80**
Median rank ordinal	-0.49	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.70**	**0.85**	**0.68**	**0.77**	**0.90**	**0.80**
EW MIN MAX	-0.67	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.70**	**0.70**	**0.70**	**1.00**	0.68	**0.79**	**0.71**	**0.77**	**0.71**
EW ZSCORE	-0.65	**0.89**	**0.89**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	0.68	**1.00**	0.56	**0.87**	**0.82**	**0.87**
PCA MINMAX	-0.39	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.79**	0.56	**1.00**	0.52	**0.87**	0.55
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.64**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.71**	**0.87**	0.52	**1.00**	**0.75**	**0.97**
Median rank lineal	-0.54	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.77**	**0.82**	**0.87**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**0.78**
Median rank total	-0.57	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.71**	**0.87**	0.55	**0.97**	**0.78**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.78**	**-0.78**	**-0.72**	**-0.72**	**-0.72**	-0.66	**-0.85**	-0.66	**-0.90**	**-0.73**	**-0.88**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.78**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.88**	**0.80**	**0.88**	**0.72**	**0.86**	**0.88**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.78**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.88**	**0.80**	**0.88**	**0.72**	**0.86**	**0.88**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.72**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	0.70	**0.82**	0.63	**0.77**	**0.80**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.72**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	0.70	**0.82**	0.63	**0.77**	**0.80**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.72**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	0.70	**0.82**	0.63	**0.77**	**0.80**
EW MIN MAX	-0.66	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.96**	**0.85**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.85**	**0.80**	**0.80**	0.70	0.70	0.70	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.83**
PCA MINMAX	-0.66	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.96**	**0.85**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.90**	**0.72**	**0.72**	0.63	0.63	0.63	**0.77**	**0.82**	**0.77**	**1.00**	**0.80**	**0.94**
Median rank lineal	**-0.73**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.96**	**0.93**	**0.96**	**0.80**	**1.00**	**0.87**
Median rank total	**-0.88**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.80**	**0.85**	**0.83**	**0.85**	**0.94**	**0.87**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.71**	**-0.71**	**-0.64**	**-0.64**	**-0.64**	-0.60	**-0.82**	-0.60	**-0.88**	**-0.66**	**-0.81**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.71**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.82**	**0.73**	**0.82**	**0.64**	**0.79**	**0.81**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.71**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.82**	**0.73**	**0.82**	**0.64**	**0.79**	**0.81**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.64**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	0.59	**0.75**	0.55	**0.66**	**0.72**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.64**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	0.59	**0.75**	0.55	**0.66**	**0.72**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.64**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.75**	0.59	**0.75**	0.55	**0.66**	**0.72**
EW MIN MAX	-0.60	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.92**	**0.77**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.82**	**0.73**	**0.73**	0.59	0.59	0.59	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.90**	**0.75**
PCA MINMAX	-0.60	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.92**	**0.77**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.88**	**0.64**	**0.64**	0.55	0.55	0.55	**0.73**	**0.78**	**0.73**	**1.00**	**0.74**	**0.87**
Median rank lineal	**-0.66**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.66**	**0.66**	**0.66**	**0.92**	**0.90**	**0.92**	**0.74**	**1.00**	**0.77**
Median rank total	**-0.81**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.77**	**0.75**	**0.77**	**0.87**	**0.77**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 44A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Spain

Spain
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.67**	**-0.67**	**-0.69**	**-0.69**	**-0.69**	-0.04	-0.20	-0.42	-0.40	-0.27	**-0.64**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.67**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.53**	**0.67**	**0.63**	**0.72**	**0.67**	**0.91**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.67**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.53**	**0.67**	**0.63**	**0.72**	**0.67**	**0.91**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.69**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.50**	**0.63**	**0.60**	**0.68**	**0.63**	**0.88**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.69**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.50**	**0.63**	**0.60**	**0.68**	**0.63**	**0.88**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.69**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.50**	**0.63**	**0.60**	**0.68**	**0.63**	**0.88**
EW MIN MAX	-0.04	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.50**	**0.50**	**0.50**	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.70**	**0.76**	**0.92**	**0.60**
EW ZSCORE	-0.20	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.69**	**0.90**	**0.95**	**0.70**
PCA MINMAX	-0.42	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.60**	**0.60**	**0.60**	**0.70**	**0.69**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.81**	**0.83**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.40	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.76**	**0.90**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.85**
Median rank lineal	-0.27	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.92**	**0.95**	**0.81**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**0.76**
Median rank total	**-0.64**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.60**	**0.70**	**0.83**	**0.85**	**0.76**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.52**	**-0.52**	**-0.52**	**-0.52**	**-0.52**	-0.06	-0.18	-0.38	-0.32	-0.22	**-0.51**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.52**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.43**	**0.56**	**0.51**	**0.61**	**0.54**	**0.79**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.52**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.43**	**0.56**	**0.51**	**0.61**	**0.54**	**0.79**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.52**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.39**	**0.51**	**0.49**	**0.56**	**0.49**	**0.76**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.52**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.39**	**0.51**	**0.49**	**0.56**	**0.49**	**0.76**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.52**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.39**	**0.51**	**0.49**	**0.56**	**0.49**	**0.76**
EW MIN MAX	-0.06	**0.43**	**0.43**	**0.39**	**0.39**	**0.39**	**1.00**	**0.84**	**0.63**	**0.68**	**0.88**	**0.46**
EW ZSCORE	-0.18	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.51**	**0.51**	**0.51**	**0.84**	**1.00**	**0.62**	**0.86**	**0.91**	**0.56**
PCA MINMAX	-0.38	**0.51**	**0.51**	**0.49**	**0.49**	**0.49**	**0.63**	**0.62**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.72**	**0.74**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.32	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.68**	**0.86**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.72**
Median rank lineal	-0.22	**0.54**	**0.54**	**0.49**	**0.49**	**0.49**	**0.88**	**0.91**	**0.72**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**0.60**
Median rank total	**-0.51**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.46**	**0.56**	**0.74**	**0.72**	**0.60**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.33	0.45	0.02	0.33	0.28	0.06
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.86**	0.52	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.86**	0.52	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.86**	0.52	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.86**	0.52	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**
Median rank ordinal	0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.86**	0.52	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**
EW MIN MAX	0.33	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.92**	0.55	**0.87**	**1.00**	0.63
EW ZSCORE	0.45	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.92**	**1.00**	0.47	**0.85**	**0.93**	0.60
PCA MINMAX	0.02	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.55	0.47	**1.00**	**0.85**	0.55	**0.81**
PCA ZSCORE	0.33	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.87**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.86**	**0.82**
Median rank lineal	0.28	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**1.00**	**0.93**	0.55	**0.86**	**1.00**	0.62
Median rank total	0.06	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	0.63	0.60	**0.81**	**0.82**	0.62	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.41	0.00	0.31	0.24	0.04
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.30	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.75**	0.31	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.65**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.30	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.75**	0.31	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.65**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.30	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.75**	0.31	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.65**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.30	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.75**	0.31	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.65**
Median rank ordinal	0.30	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.75**	0.31	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.65**
EW MIN MAX	0.29	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**1.00**	**0.88**	0.35	**0.80**	**0.98**	0.44
EW ZSCORE	0.41	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.88**	**1.00**	0.28	**0.79**	**0.90**	0.40
PCA MINMAX	0.00	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.35	0.28	**1.00**	**0.79**	0.34	**0.71**
PCA ZSCORE	0.31	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.80**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.71**
Median rank lineal	0.24	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.98**	**0.90**	0.34	**0.79**	**1.00**	0.40
Median rank total	0.04	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	**0.65**	0.44	0.40	**0.71**	**0.71**	0.40	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2009-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.74**	**-0.74**	-0.63	-0.63	-0.63	**-0.69**	**-0.76**	**-0.89**	**-0.84**	**-0.81**	**-0.88**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.74**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.56	0.64	**0.77**	**0.72**	0.64	**0.91**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.74**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.56	0.64	**0.77**	**0.72**	0.64	**0.91**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.63	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.44	0.48	0.64	0.57	0.50	**0.81**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.63	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.44	0.48	0.64	0.57	0.50	**0.81**
Median rank ordinal	-0.63	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.44	0.48	0.64	0.57	0.50	**0.81**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.69**	0.56	0.56	0.44	0.44	0.44	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.90**	**0.80**	**0.93**	**0.76**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.76**	0.64	0.64	0.48	0.48	0.48	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.85**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.89**	**0.77**	**0.77**	0.64	0.64	0.64	**0.90**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**0.94**	**0.96**	**0.94**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.84**	**0.72**	**0.72**	0.57	0.57	0.57	**0.80**	**0.97**	**0.94**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.91**
Median rank lineal	**-0.81**	0.64	0.64	0.50	0.50	0.50	**0.93**	**0.97**	**0.96**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.88**
Median rank total	**-0.88**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.76**	**0.85**	**0.94**	**0.91**	**0.88**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2009-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.69**	**-0.69**	-0.57	-0.57	-0.57	**-0.64**	**-0.67**	**-0.86**	**-0.79**	**-0.73**	**-0.82**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.69**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.92**	0.50	0.56	**0.71**	**0.68**	0.57	**0.85**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.69**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.92**	0.50	0.56	**0.71**	**0.68**	0.57	**0.85**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.57	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.40	0.42	0.59	0.53	0.46	**0.72**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.57	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.40	0.42	0.59	0.53	0.46	**0.72**
Median rank ordinal	-0.57	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.40	0.42	0.59	0.53	0.46	**0.72**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.64**	0.50	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.40	**1.00**	**0.84**	**0.89**	**0.74**	**0.90**	**0.68**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.67**	0.56	0.56	0.42	0.42	0.42	**0.84**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.70**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.86**	**0.71**	**0.71**	0.59	0.59	0.59	**0.89**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.93**	**0.88**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.79**	**0.68**	**0.68**	0.53	0.53	0.53	**0.74**	**0.95**	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.81**
Median rank lineal	**-0.73**	0.57	0.57	0.46	0.46	0.46	**0.90**	**0.95**	**0.93**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**0.76**
Median rank total	**-0.82**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.72**	**0.68**	**0.70**	**0.88**	**0.81**	**0.76**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 45A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: France

France
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.21	-0.21	-0.20	-0.20	-0.23	-0.19	0.26	-0.11	-0.03	0.12	-0.26
EW MINMAX ordinal	-0.21	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.97**	0.01	-0.44	0.37	-0.22	-0.15	**0.93**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.21	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.97**	0.01	-0.44	0.37	-0.22	-0.15	**0.93**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.20	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	-0.01	-0.33	0.33	-0.15	-0.11	**0.83**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.20	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	-0.01	-0.33	0.33	-0.15	-0.11	**0.83**
Median rank ordinal	-0.23	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	-0.01	-0.38	0.33	-0.19	-0.14	**0.89**
EW MINMAX	-0.19	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	**1.00**	0.10	0.43	0.45	**0.59**	0.22
EW ZSCORE	0.26	-0.44	-0.44	-0.33	-0.33	-0.38	0.10	**1.00**	-0.16	0.44	**0.49**	-0.39
PCA MINMAX	-0.11	0.37	0.37	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.43	-0.16	**1.00**	0.45	**0.52**	**0.54**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.03	-0.22	-0.22	-0.15	-0.15	-0.19	0.45	0.44	0.45	**1.00**	**0.90**	-0.06
Median rank lineal	0.12	-0.15	-0.15	-0.11	-0.11	-0.14	**0.59**	**0.49**	**0.52**	**0.90**	**1.00**	0.03
Median rank total	-0.26	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.89**	0.22	-0.39	**0.54**	-0.06	0.03	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.19	-0.19	-0.17	-0.17	-0.20	-0.17	0.23	-0.09	-0.04	0.10	-0.25
EW MINMAX ordinal	-0.19	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.91**	0.00	-0.39	0.30	-0.19	-0.13	**0.87**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.19	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.91**	0.00	-0.39	0.30	-0.19	-0.13	**0.87**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.17	**0.85**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	-0.01	-0.29	0.27	-0.12	-0.08	**0.73**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.17	**0.85**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	-0.01	-0.29	0.27	-0.12	-0.08	**0.73**
Median rank ordinal	-0.20	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	-0.01	-0.32	0.27	-0.16	-0.10	**0.79**
EW MINMAX	-0.17	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	**1.00**	0.09	0.42	0.43	**0.57**	0.20
EW ZSCORE	0.23	-0.39	-0.39	-0.29	-0.29	-0.32	0.09	**1.00**	-0.16	0.42	**0.46**	-0.34
PCA MINMAX	-0.09	0.30	0.30	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.42	-0.16	**1.00**	0.43	**0.50**	**0.48**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.04	-0.19	-0.19	-0.12	-0.12	-0.16	0.43	0.42	0.43	**1.00**	**0.88**	-0.03
Median rank lineal	0.10	-0.13	-0.13	-0.08	-0.08	-0.10	**0.57**	**0.46**	**0.50**	**0.88**	**1.00**	0.04
Median rank total	-0.25	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.79**	0.20	-0.34	**0.48**	-0.03	0.04	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.41	-0.41	-0.23	-0.23	-0.41	0.58	0.49		0.58	0.58	-0.41
EW MINMAX ordinal	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.92**	-0.60	-0.35		-0.60	-0.60	**1.00**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.92**	-0.60	-0.35		-0.60	-0.60	**1.00**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.23	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	-0.56	-0.19		-0.56	-0.56	**0.79**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.23	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	-0.56	-0.19		-0.56	-0.56	**0.79**
Median rank ordinal	-0.41	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	-0.56	-0.28		-0.56	-0.56	**0.92**
EW MINMAX	0.58	-0.60	-0.60	-0.56	-0.56	-0.56	**1.00**	0.50		**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.60
EW ZSCORE	0.49	-0.35	-0.35	-0.19	-0.19	-0.28	0.50	**1.00**		0.50	0.50	-0.35
PCA MINMAX												
PCA ZSCORE	0.58	-0.60	-0.60	-0.56	-0.56	-0.56	**1.00**	0.50		**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.60
Median rank lineal	0.58	-0.60	-0.60	-0.56	-0.56	-0.56	**1.00**	0.50		**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.60
Median rank total	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.92**	-0.60	-0.35		-0.60	-0.60	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.43	0.13	0.00	-0.07	0.03	-0.03
EW MINMAX ordinal	0.06	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.27	-0.49	0.29	-0.40	-0.16	**0.81**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.06	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.27	-0.49	0.29	-0.40	-0.16	**0.81**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.03	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.22	-0.47	0.24	-0.42	-0.19	**0.74**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.03	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.22	-0.47	0.24	-0.42	-0.19	**0.74**
Median rank ordinal	0.03	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.22	-0.47	0.24	-0.42	-0.19	**0.74**
EW MINMAX	-0.43	0.27	0.27	0.22	0.22	0.22	**1.00**	-0.12	0.47	0.22	0.42	0.54
EW ZSCORE	0.13	-0.49	-0.49	-0.47	-0.47	-0.47	-0.12	**1.00**	-0.22	0.60	0.54	-0.40
PCA MINMAX	0.00	0.29	0.29	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.47	-0.22	**1.00**	0.28	0.47	0.46
PCA ZSCORE	-0.07	-0.40	-0.40	-0.42	-0.42	-0.42	0.22	0.60	0.28	**1.00**	**0.84**	-0.17
Median rank lineal	0.03	-0.16	-0.16	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	0.42	0.54	0.47	**0.84**	**1.00**	0.06
Median rank total	-0.03	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.74**	0.54	-0.40	0.46	-0.17	0.06	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.41	-0.41	-0.23	-0.23	-0.41	0.58	0.49		0.58	0.58	-0.41
EW MINMAX ordinal	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.92**	-0.60	-0.35		-0.60	-0.60	**1.00**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.92**	-0.60	-0.35		-0.60	-0.60	**1.00**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.23	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	-0.56	-0.19		-0.56	-0.56	**0.79**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.23	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	-0.56	-0.19		-0.56	-0.56	**0.79**
Median rank ordinal	-0.41	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	-0.56	-0.28		-0.56	-0.56	**0.92**
EW MINMAX	0.58	-0.60	-0.60	-0.56	-0.56	-0.56	**1.00**	0.50		**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.60
EW ZSCORE	0.49	-0.35	-0.35	-0.19	-0.19	-0.28	0.50	**1.00**		0.50	0.50	-0.35
PCA MINMAX												
PCA ZSCORE	0.58	-0.60	-0.60	-0.56	-0.56	-0.56	**1.00**	0.50		**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.60
Median rank lineal	0.58	-0.60	-0.60	-0.56	-0.56	-0.56	**1.00**	0.50		**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.60
Median rank total	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.92**	-0.60	-0.35		-0.60	-0.60	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MINMAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MINMAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.38	-0.38	-0.23	-0.23	-0.37	0.54	0.45	**0.45**	0.54	0.54	-0.38
EW MINMAX ordinal	-0.38	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.87**	-0.57	-0.33	**-0.33**	-0.57	-0.57	**1.00**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.38	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.87**	-0.57	-0.33	**-0.33**	-0.57	-0.57	**1.00**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.23	**0.73**	**0.73**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	-0.49	-0.16	**-0.16**	-0.49	-0.49	**0.73**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.23	**0.73**	**0.73**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	-0.49	-0.16	**-0.16**	-0.49	-0.49	**0.73**
Median rank ordinal	-0.37	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**1.00**	-0.49	-0.25	**-0.25**	-0.49	-0.49	**0.87**
EW MINMAX	0.54	-0.57	-0.57	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	**1.00**	0.50	**0.50**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.57
EW ZSCORE	0.45	-0.33	-0.33	-0.16	-0.16	-0.25	0.50	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.50	0.50	-0.33
PCA MINMAX	**0.45**	**-0.33**	**-0.33**	**-0.16**	**-0.16**	**-0.25**	**0.50**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
PCA ZSCORE	0.54	-0.57	-0.57	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	**1.00**	0.50	**0.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.57
Median rank lineal	0.54	-0.57	-0.57	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	**1.00**	0.50	**0.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.57
Median rank total	-0.38	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.87**	-0.57	-0.33	**0.00**	-0.57	-0.57	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 46A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Italy

Italy
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.49**	**-0.49**	-0.41	-0.41	-0.42	**-0.72**	-0.47	**-0.78**	**-0.65**	**-0.76**	**-0.57**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.49**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.99**	**0.53**	**0.47**	0.39	0.31	0.44	**0.79**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.49**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.99**	**0.53**	**0.47**	0.39	0.31	0.44	**0.79**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.41	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	**0.49**	0.34	0.32	0.40	**0.76**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.41	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	**0.49**	0.34	0.32	0.40	**0.76**
Median rank ordinal	-0.42	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.50**	**0.49**	0.35	0.31	0.41	**0.78**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.72**	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.48**	**0.48**	**0.50**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.95**	**0.75**	**0.96**	**0.86**
EW ZSCORE	-0.47	**0.47**	**0.47**	**0.49**	**0.49**	**0.49**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.75**	**0.80**	**0.71**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.78**	0.39	0.39	0.34	0.34	0.35	**0.95**	**0.71**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.99**	**0.75**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.65**	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.31	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.80**	**0.53**
Median rank lineal	**-0.76**	0.44	0.44	0.40	0.40	0.41	**0.96**	**0.80**	**0.99**	**0.80**	**1.00**	**0.77**
Median rank total	**-0.57**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.78**	**0.86**	**0.71**	**0.75**	**0.53**	**0.77**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.38	-0.38	-0.30	-0.30	-0.31	**-0.62**	-0.40	**-0.70**	**-0.54**	**-0.67**	**-0.40**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.38	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.96**	**0.41**	0.39	0.29	0.20	0.34	**0.73**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.38	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.96**	**0.41**	0.39	0.29	0.20	0.34	**0.73**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.30	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	0.36	0.39	0.23	0.22	0.29	**0.69**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.30	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	0.36	0.39	0.23	0.22	0.29	**0.69**
Median rank ordinal	-0.31	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	0.37	0.39	0.25	0.20	0.30	**0.70**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.62**	**0.41**	**0.41**	0.36	0.36	0.37	**1.00**	**0.76**	**0.92**	**0.66**	**0.94**	**0.75**
EW ZSCORE	-0.40	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	**0.76**	**1.00**	**0.69**	**0.69**	**0.75**	**0.61**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.70**	0.29	0.29	0.23	0.23	0.25	**0.92**	**0.69**	**1.00**	**0.69**	**0.96**	**0.61**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.54**	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.20	**0.66**	**0.69**	**0.69**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.40**
Median rank lineal	**-0.67**	0.34	0.34	0.29	0.29	0.30	**0.94**	**0.75**	**0.96**	**0.73**	**1.00**	**0.65**
Median rank total	**-0.40**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.69**	**0.69**	**0.70**	**0.75**	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.40**	**0.65**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.49	-0.49	-0.47	-0.47	-0.47	**-0.88**	-0.63	**-0.96**	**-0.86**	**-0.87**	**-0.77**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.49	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.66	**0.74**	0.45	**0.71**	0.69	**0.73**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.49	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.66	**0.74**	0.45	**0.71**	0.69	**0.73**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.47	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.68	**0.79**	0.46	**0.73**	**0.71**	**0.74**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.47	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.68	**0.79**	0.46	**0.73**	**0.71**	**0.74**
Median rank ordinal	-0.47	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.68	**0.79**	0.46	**0.73**	**0.71**	**0.74**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.88**	0.66	0.66	0.68	0.68	0.68	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.94**	**0.92**	**0.97**	**0.94**
EW ZSCORE	-0.63	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.92**	**0.91**	**0.90**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.96**	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46	0.46	**0.94**	**0.71**	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.92**	**0.85**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.86**	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.89**
Median rank lineal	**-0.87**	0.69	0.69	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.97**	**0.91**	**0.92**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**0.97**
Median rank total	**-0.77**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.94**	**0.90**	**0.85**	**0.89**	**0.97**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.41	-0.41	-0.35	-0.35	-0.35	**-0.77**	-0.57	**-0.92**	**-0.75**	**-0.76**	**-0.64**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.43	0.63	0.32	0.57	0.49	**0.61**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.41	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.43	0.63	0.32	0.57	0.49	**0.61**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.35	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.47	**0.67**	0.34	**0.61**	0.53	**0.64**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.35	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.47	**0.67**	0.34	**0.61**	0.53	**0.64**
Median rank ordinal	-0.35	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.47	**0.67**	0.34	**0.61**	0.53	**0.64**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.77**	0.43	0.43	0.47	0.47	0.47	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.89**	**0.83**	**0.94**	**0.86**
EW ZSCORE	-0.57	0.63	0.63	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.77**	**1.00**	0.67	**0.86**	**0.83**	**0.82**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.92**	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.34	**0.89**	0.67	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.87**	**0.75**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.75**	0.57	0.57	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.83**	**0.86**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.80**
Median rank lineal	**-0.76**	0.49	0.49	0.53	0.53	0.53	**0.94**	**0.83**	**0.87**	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.90**
Median rank total	**-0.64**	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.64**	**0.64**	**0.64**	**0.86**	**0.82**	**0.75**	**0.80**	**0.90**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.23	0.23	0.38	0.38	0.38				-0.10		0.38
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.23	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**				-0.37		**0.98**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.23	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**				-0.37		**0.98**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.38	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**				-0.41		**1.00**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.38	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**				-0.41		**1.00**
Median rank ordinal	0.38	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**				-0.41		**1.00**
EW MIN MAX												
EW ZSCORE												
PCA MINMAX												
PCA ZSCORE	-0.10	-0.37	-0.37	-0.41	-0.41	-0.41				**1.00**		-0.41
Median rank lineal												
Median rank total	0.38	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**				-0.41		**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.17	0.17	0.27	0.27	0.27	**0.27**	**0.27**	**0.27**	-0.09	**-0.09**	0.27
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.17	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	-0.33	**-0.33**	**0.96**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.17	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	-0.33	**-0.33**	**0.96**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.27	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.36	**-0.36**	**1.00**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.27	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.36	**-0.36**	**1.00**
Median rank ordinal	0.27	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.36	**-0.36**	**1.00**
EW MIN MAX	**0.27**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
EW ZSCORE	**0.27**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
PCA MINMAX	**0.27**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.09	-0.33	-0.33	-0.36	-0.36	-0.36	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	-0.36
Median rank lineal	**-0.09**	**-0.33**	**-0.33**	**-0.36**	**-0.36**	**-0.36**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
Median rank total	0.27	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	-0.36	**0.00**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 47A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Netherlands

Netherlands
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.17	-0.17	-0.20	-0.20	-0.15	0.07	0.11	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.00
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.17	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.99**	0.32	0.34	0.25	**0.53**	0.32	**0.77**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.17	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.99**	0.32	0.34	0.25	**0.53**	0.32	**0.77**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.20	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	0.26	0.24	0.22	**0.52**	0.26	**0.76**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.20	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	0.26	0.24	0.22	**0.52**	0.26	**0.76**
Median rank ordinal	-0.15	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	0.36	0.35	0.30	**0.59**	0.36	**0.81**
EW MIN MAX	0.07	0.32	0.32	0.26	0.26	0.36	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.90**	**0.74**	**0.93**	**0.67**
EW ZSCORE	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.24	0.24	0.35	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.81**	**0.72**	**0.93**	**0.66**
PCA MINMAX	0.08	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.22	0.30	**0.90**	**0.81**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.94**	**0.71**
PCA ZSCORE	0.10	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.52**	**0.52**	**0.59**	**0.74**	**0.72**	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.87**	**0.94**
Median rank lineal	0.10	0.32	0.32	0.26	0.26	0.36	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.94**	**0.87**	**1.00**	**0.76**
Median rank total	0.00	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.81**	**0.67**	**0.66**	**0.71**	**0.94**	**0.76**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.13	-0.13	-0.16	-0.16	-0.10	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.01
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.13	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.96**	0.23	0.24	0.19	**0.44**	0.23	**0.63**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.13	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.96**	0.23	0.24	0.19	**0.44**	0.23	**0.63**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.16	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	0.19	0.20	0.16	**0.43**	0.21	**0.60**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.16	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	0.19	0.20	0.16	**0.43**	0.21	**0.60**
Median rank ordinal	-0.10	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	0.25	0.26	0.22	**0.48**	0.27	**0.65**
EW MIN MAX	0.05	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.19	0.25	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.85**	**0.66**	**0.88**	**0.55**
EW ZSCORE	0.09	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.20	0.26	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.73**	**0.65**	**0.90**	**0.57**
PCA MINMAX	0.07	0.19	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.22	**0.85**	**0.73**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.90**	**0.55**
PCA ZSCORE	0.07	**0.44**	**0.44**	**0.43**	**0.43**	**0.48**	**0.66**	**0.65**	**0.71**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.87**
Median rank lineal	0.09	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.27	**0.88**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.62**
Median rank total	0.01	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.60**	**0.60**	**0.65**	**0.55**	**0.57**	**0.55**	**0.87**	**0.62**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.33	-0.33	-0.31	-0.31	-0.29	-0.46	-0.32	-0.45	-0.06	-0.35	-0.11
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.33	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.99**	0.69	0.57	**0.74**	0.68	0.67	**0.83**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.33	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.99**	0.69	0.57	**0.74**	0.68	0.67	**0.83**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.31	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	0.55	0.39	0.69	0.68	0.58	**0.83**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.31	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	0.55	0.39	0.69	0.68	0.58	**0.83**
Median rank ordinal	-0.29	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	0.64	0.52	**0.76**	**0.73**	0.69	**0.86**
EW MIN MAX	-0.46	0.69	0.69	0.55	0.55	0.64	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.88**	0.67	**0.87**	0.69
EW ZSCORE	-0.32	0.57	0.57	0.39	0.39	0.52	**0.92**	**1.00**	**0.75**	0.64	**0.88**	0.62
PCA MINMAX	-0.45	**0.74**	**0.74**	0.69	0.69	**0.76**	**0.88**	**0.75**	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.93**	**0.85**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.06	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	**0.73**	0.67	0.64	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.86**	**0.96**
Median rank lineal	-0.35	0.67	0.67	0.58	0.58	0.69	**0.87**	**0.88**	**0.93**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.82**
Median rank total	-0.11	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.86**	0.69	0.62	**0.85**	**0.96**	**0.82**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.27	-0.27	-0.29	-0.29	-0.23	-0.40	-0.25	-0.34	-0.03	-0.23	-0.03
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.96**	0.62	0.44	**0.65**	**0.61**	0.54	**0.74**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.96**	0.62	0.44	**0.65**	**0.61**	0.54	**0.74**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.29	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	0.47	0.31	0.59	**0.59**	0.48	**0.70**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.29	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	0.47	0.31	0.59	**0.59**	0.48	**0.70**
Median rank ordinal	-0.23	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**1.00**	0.55	0.38	**0.65**	**0.65**	0.55	**0.76**
EW MIN MAX	-0.40	0.62	0.62	0.47	0.47	0.55	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.83**	0.61	**0.82**	0.60
EW ZSCORE	-0.25	0.44	0.44	0.31	0.31	0.38	**0.88**	**1.00**	0.65	0.54	**0.84**	0.49
PCA MINMAX	-0.34	**0.65**	**0.65**	0.59	0.59	**0.65**	**0.83**	0.65	**1.00**	**0.80**	**0.91**	**0.76**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.03	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.59**	**0.59**	**0.65**	0.61	0.54	**0.80**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.91**
Median rank lineal	-0.23	0.54	0.54	0.48	0.48	0.55	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.91**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.72**
Median rank total	-0.03	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.70**	**0.70**	**0.76**	0.60	0.49	**0.76**	**0.91**	**0.72**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.49	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.12	0.24	0.20	0.42	0.24	0.45
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.49	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.67	**0.86**	0.61	**0.88**	**0.83**	**0.95**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.49	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.67	**0.86**	0.61	**0.88**	**0.83**	**0.95**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.52	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.86**	0.64	**0.93**	**0.86**	**0.96**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.52	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.86**	0.64	**0.93**	**0.86**	**0.96**
Median rank ordinal	0.52	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.86**	0.64	**0.93**	**0.86**	**0.96**
EW MIN MAX	0.12	0.67	0.67	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.71**	**1.00**	**0.94**	**0.82**	**0.88**	**0.94**	**0.82**
EW ZSCORE	0.24	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.94**	**1.00**	**0.76**	**0.92**	**0.96**	**0.93**
PCA MINMAX	0.20	0.61	0.61	0.64	0.64	0.64	**0.82**	**0.76**	**1.00**	**0.84**	**0.88**	**0.79**
PCA ZSCORE	0.42	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.88**	**0.92**	**0.84**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.97**
Median rank lineal	0.24	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.94**	**0.96**	**0.88**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**0.94**
Median rank total	0.45	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.82**	**0.93**	**0.79**	**0.97**	**0.94**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.13	0.22	0.18	0.33	0.22	0.35
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.40	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	0.55	**0.76**	0.54	**0.83**	**0.76**	**0.89**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.40	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	0.55	**0.76**	0.54	**0.83**	**0.76**	**0.89**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.42	**0.94**	**0.94**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.55	**0.75**	0.51	**0.85**	**0.75**	**0.87**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.42	**0.94**	**0.94**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.55	**0.75**	0.51	**0.85**	**0.75**	**0.87**
Median rank ordinal	0.42	**0.94**	**0.94**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.55	**0.75**	0.51	**0.85**	**0.75**	**0.87**
EW MIN MAX	0.13	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	**1.00**	**0.89**	**0.77**	**0.79**	**0.89**	**0.66**
EW ZSCORE	0.22	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.89**	**1.00**	**0.69**	**0.86**	**0.93**	**0.86**
PCA MINMAX	0.18	0.54	0.54	0.51	0.51	0.51	**0.77**	**0.69**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.85**	**0.69**
PCA ZSCORE	0.33	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.79**	**0.86**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.93**	**0.92**
Median rank lineal	0.22	**0.76**	**0.76**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.89**	**0.93**	**0.85**	**0.93**	**1.00**	**0.86**
Median rank total	0.35	**0.89**	**0.89**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.66**	**0.86**	**0.69**	**0.92**	**0.86**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 48A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Austria

Austria
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.231	0.390	0.223	0.244	0.310	0.285
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.001	**1**	**1.000**	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.991**	0.312	0.356	0.433	0.275	0.392	**0.688**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.001	**1.000**	**1**	**0.970**	**0.970**	**0.991**	0.312	0.356	0.433	0.275	0.392	**0.688**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.004	**0.970**	**0.970**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.988**	0.173	0.233	0.294	0.145	0.259	**0.586**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.004	**0.970**	**0.970**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.988**	0.173	0.233	0.294	0.145	0.259	**0.586**
Median rank ordinal	0.002	**0.991**	**0.991**	**0.988**	**0.988**	**1**	0.227	0.283	0.348	0.195	0.313	**0.619**
EW MIN MAX	0.231	0.312	0.312	0.173	0.173	0.227	**1**	**0.934**	**0.930**	**0.827**	**0.952**	**0.808**
EW ZSCORE	0.390	0.356	0.356	0.233	0.233	0.283	**0.934**	**1**	**0.925**	**0.900**	**0.986**	**0.875**
PCA MINMAX	0.223	0.433	0.433	0.294	0.294	0.348	**0.930**	**0.925**	**1**	**0.876**	**0.974**	**0.867**
PCA ZSCORE	0.244	0.275	0.275	0.145	0.145	0.195	**0.827**	**0.900**	**0.876**	**1**	**0.908**	**0.784**
Median rank lineal	0.310	0.392	0.392	0.259	0.259	0.313	**0.952**	**0.986**	**0.974**	**0.908**	**1**	**0.890**
Median rank total	0.285	**0.688**	**0.688**	**0.586**	**0.586**	**0.619**	**0.808**	**0.875**	**0.867**	**0.784**	**0.890**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	-0.022	-0.022	-0.021	-0.021	-0.021	0.190	0.311	0.194	0.181	0.236	0.198
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.022	**1**	**1.000**	**0.905**	**0.905**	**0.960**	0.233	0.278	0.351	0.232	0.306	**0.585**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.022	**1.000**	**1**	**0.905**	**0.905**	**0.960**	0.233	0.278	0.351	0.232	0.306	**0.585**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.021	**0.905**	**0.905**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.947**	0.108	0.153	0.220	0.107	0.184	**0.442**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.021	**0.905**	**0.905**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.947**	0.108	0.153	0.220	0.107	0.184	**0.442**
Median rank ordinal	-0.021	**0.960**	**0.960**	**0.947**	**0.947**	**1**	0.154	0.198	0.267	0.153	0.228	**0.495**
EW MIN MAX	0.190	0.233	0.233	0.108	0.108	0.154	**1**	**0.911**	**0.890**	**0.771**	**0.911**	**0.672**
EW ZSCORE	0.311	0.278	0.278	0.153	0.153	0.198	**0.911**	**1**	**0.891**	**0.862**	**0.962**	**0.758**
PCA MINMAX	0.194	0.351	0.351	0.220	0.220	0.267	**0.890**	**0.891**	**1**	**0.831**	**0.937**	**0.747**
PCA ZSCORE	0.181	0.232	0.232	0.107	0.107	0.153	**0.771**	**0.862**	**0.831**	**1**	**0.864**	**0.700**
Median rank lineal	0.236	0.306	0.306	0.184	0.184	0.228	**0.911**	**0.962**	**0.937**	**0.864**	**1**	**0.766**
Median rank total	0.198	**0.585**	**0.585**	**0.442**	**0.442**	**0.495**	**0.672**	**0.758**	**0.747**	**0.700**	**0.766**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.283	0.340	0.340	0.260	0.340	0.086
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.017	**1**	**1.000**	**0.983**	**0.983**	**1.000**	0.639	0.647	0.647	0.342	0.647	**0.933**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.017	**1.000**	**1**	**0.983**	**0.983**	**1.000**	0.639	0.647	0.647	0.342	0.647	**0.933**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.017	**0.983**	**0.983**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.983**	0.548	0.568	0.568	0.251	0.568	**0.883**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.017	**0.983**	**0.983**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.983**	0.548	0.568	0.568	0.251	0.568	**0.883**
Median rank ordinal	0.017	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.983**	**0.983**	**1**	0.639	0.647	0.647	0.342	0.647	**0.933**
EW MIN MAX	0.283	0.639	0.639	0.548	0.548	0.639	**1**	**0.982**	**0.982**	**0.750**	**0.982**	**0.822**
EW ZSCORE	0.340	0.647	0.647	0.568	0.568	0.647	**0.982**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.818**	**1.000**	**0.837**
PCA MINMAX	0.340	0.647	0.647	0.568	0.568	0.647	**0.982**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.818**	**1.000**	**0.837**
PCA ZSCORE	0.260	0.342	0.342	0.251	0.251	0.342	**0.750**	**0.818**	**0.818**	**1**	**0.818**	0.639
Median rank lineal	0.340	0.647	0.647	0.568	0.568	0.647	**0.982**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.818**	**1**	**0.837**
Median r	0.086	**0.933**	**0.933**	**0.883**	**0.883**	**0.933**	**0.822**	**0.837**	**0.837**	0.639	**0.837**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.258	0.327	0.327	0.236	0.327	0.122
EW MIN MAX ordinal	0.000	**1**	**1.000**	**0.944**	**0.944**	**1.000**	0.550	0.522	0.522	0.301	0.522	**0.833**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	0.000	**1.000**	**1**	**0.944**	**0.944**	**1.000**	0.550	0.522	0.522	0.301	0.522	**0.833**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	0.000	**0.944**	**0.944**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.944**	0.471	0.447	0.447	0.215	0.447	**0.778**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	0.000	**0.944**	**0.944**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.944**	0.471	0.447	0.447	0.215	0.447	**0.778**
Median rank ordinal	0.000	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.944**	**0.944**	**1**	0.550	0.522	0.522	0.301	0.522	**0.833**
EW MIN MAX	0.258	0.550	0.550	0.471	0.471	0.550	**1**	**0.949**	**0.949**	0.730	**0.949**	**0.707**
EW ZSCORE	0.327	0.522	0.522	0.447	0.447	0.522	**0.949**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.808**	**1.000**	**0.745**
PCA MINMAX	0.327	0.522	0.522	0.447	0.447	0.522	**0.949**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.808**	**1.000**	**0.745**
PCA ZSCORE	0.236	0.301	0.301	0.215	0.215	0.301	0.730	**0.808**	**0.808**	**1**	**0.808**	0.559
Median rank lineal	0.327	0.522	0.522	0.447	0.447	0.522	**0.949**	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.808**	**1**	**0.745**
Median rank total	0.122	**0.833**	**0.833**	**0.778**	**0.778**	**0.833**	**0.707**	**0.745**	**0.745**	0.559	**0.745**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	-0.262	-0.262	-0.176	-0.176	-0.176	0.173	0.342	0.047	0.005	0.124	0.133
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.262	**1**	**1.000**	**0.922**	**0.922**	**0.966**	-0.244	-0.361	-0.019	-0.133	-0.179	0.131
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.262	**1.000**	**1**	**0.922**	**0.922**	**0.966**	-0.244	-0.361	-0.019	-0.133	-0.179	0.131
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.176	**0.922**	**0.922**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.983**	-0.378	-0.468	-0.138	-0.284	-0.312	-0.059
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.176	**0.922**	**0.922**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.983**	-0.378	-0.468	-0.138	-0.284	-0.312	-0.059
Median rank ordinal	-0.176	**0.966**	**0.966**	**0.983**	**0.983**	**1**	-0.378	-0.468	-0.138	-0.284	-0.312	-0.042
EW MIN MAX	0.173	-0.244	-0.244	-0.378	-0.378	-0.378	**1**	**0.971**	**0.855**	0.699	**0.973**	**0.788**
EW ZSCORE	0.342	-0.361	-0.361	-0.468	-0.468	-0.468	**0.971**	**1**	**0.805**	0.680	**0.945**	**0.733**
PCA MINMAX	0.047	-0.019	-0.019	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138	**0.855**	**0.805**	**1**	**0.805**	**0.945**	**0.733**
PCA ZSCORE	0.005	-0.133	-0.133	-0.284	-0.284	-0.284	0.699	0.680	**0.805**	**1**	**0.794**	**0.843**
Median rank lineal	0.124	-0.179	-0.179	-0.312	-0.312	-0.312	**0.973**	**0.945**	**0.945**	**0.794**	**1**	**0.797**
Median rank total	0.133	0.131	0.131	-0.059	-0.059	-0.042	**0.788**	**0.733**	**0.733**	**0.843**	**0.797**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1**	-0.233	-0.233	-0.182	-0.182	-0.182	0.138	0.257	0.073	-0.037	0.066	0.121
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.233	**1**	**1.000**	**0.847**	**0.847**	**0.910**	-0.179	-0.303	0.000	-0.114	-0.136	0.157
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.233	**1.000**	**1**	**0.847**	**0.847**	**0.910**	-0.179	-0.303	0.000	-0.114	-0.136	0.157
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.182	**0.847**	**0.847**	**1**	**1.000**	**0.943**	-0.260	-0.380	-0.104	-0.207	-0.216	-0.029
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.182	**0.847**	**0.847**	**1.000**	**1**	**0.943**	-0.260	-0.380	-0.104	-0.207	-0.216	-0.029
Median rank ordinal	-0.182	**0.910**	**0.910**	**0.943**	**0.943**	**1**	-0.260	-0.380	-0.104	-0.207	-0.216	0.029
EW MIN MAX	0.138	-0.179	-0.179	-0.260	-0.260	-0.260	**1**	**0.943**	**0.825**	**0.668**	**0.949**	**0.716**
EW ZSCORE	0.257	-0.303	-0.303	-0.380	-0.380	-0.380	**0.943**	**1**	**0.750**	0.667	**0.894**	**0.656**
PCA MINMAX	0.073	0.000	0.000	-0.104	-0.104	-0.104	**0.825**	**0.750**	**1**	**0.750**	**0.894**	**0.656**
PCA ZSCORE	-0.037	-0.114	-0.114	-0.207	-0.207	-0.207	**0.668**	0.667	**0.750**	**1**	**0.745**	**0.759**
Median rank lineal	0.066	-0.136	-0.136	-0.216	-0.216	-0.216	**0.949**	**0.894**	**0.894**	**0.745**	**1**	**0.710**
Median rank total	0.121	0.157	0.157	-0.029	-0.029	0.029	**0.716**	**0.656**	**0.656**	**0.759**	**0.710**	**1**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 49A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Portugal

Portugal
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.36	-0.36	-0.35	-0.35	-0.35	**-0.65**	**-0.74**	**-0.67**	**-0.69**	**-0.71**	**-0.59**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	0.24	**0.53**	**0.56**	**0.54**	**0.90**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.36	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	0.24	**0.53**	**0.56**	**0.54**	**0.90**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.35	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	0.23	**0.52**	**0.56**	**0.53**	**0.90**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.35	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	0.23	**0.52**	**0.56**	**0.53**	**0.90**
Median rank ordinal	-0.35	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.48**	0.23	**0.52**	**0.56**	**0.53**	**0.90**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.65**	**0.48**	**0.48**	**0.48**	**0.48**	**0.48**	**1.00**	**0.82**	**0.94**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.74**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.74**	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.23	**0.82**	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.54**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.67**	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.52**	**0.52**	**0.52**	**0.94**	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.98**	**0.78**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.69**	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.56**	**0.93**	**0.82**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.82**
Median rank lineal	**-0.71**	**0.54**	**0.54**	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.93**	**0.84**	**0.98**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**0.80**
Median rank total	**-0.59**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.74**	**0.54**	**0.78**	**0.82**	**0.80**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.28	-0.28	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	**-0.59**	**-0.66**	**-0.58**	**-0.60**	**-0.61**	**-0.47**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.28	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.37	0.19	**0.40**	**0.45**	**0.41**	**0.77**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.28	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.37	0.19	**0.40**	**0.45**	**0.41**	**0.77**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.25	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.35	0.17	**0.37**	**0.42**	**0.39**	**0.74**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.25	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.35	0.17	**0.37**	**0.42**	**0.39**	**0.74**
Median rank ordinal	-0.25	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.35	0.17	**0.37**	**0.42**	**0.39**	**0.74**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.59**	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.35	**1.00**	**0.78**	**0.91**	**0.88**	**0.89**	**0.63**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.66**	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.17	**0.78**	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.75**	**0.77**	**0.44**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.58**	**0.40**	**0.40**	**0.37**	**0.37**	**0.37**	**0.91**	**0.71**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.96**	**0.66**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.60**	**0.45**	**0.45**	**0.42**	**0.42**	**0.42**	**0.88**	**0.75**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.71**
Median rank lineal	**-0.61**	**0.41**	**0.41**	**0.39**	**0.39**	**0.39**	**0.89**	**0.77**	**0.96**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**0.67**
Median rank total	**-0.47**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.74**	**0.63**	**0.44**	**0.66**	**0.71**	**0.67**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.81**	**-0.81**	**-0.80**	**-0.80**	**-0.80**	**-0.91**	**-0.91**	**-0.94**	**-0.94**	**-0.94**	**-0.94**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.81**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.94**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.95**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.81**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.94**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.95**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.80**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.92**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.93**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.80**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.92**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.93**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.80**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.92**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.93**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.91**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.91**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.97**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.94**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.94**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**
Median rank lineal	**-0.94**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.97**
Median rank total	**-0.94**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**0.96**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.97**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.72**	**-0.72**	**-0.67**	**-0.67**	**-0.67**	**-0.86**	**-0.86**	**-0.88**	**-0.88**	**-0.88**	**-0.87**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.72**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.82**	**0.85**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.87**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.72**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.82**	**0.85**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.87**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.67**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.81**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.83**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.67**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.81**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.83**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.67**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.77**	**0.81**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.83**
EW MIN MAX	**-0.86**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**1.00**	**0.97**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.90**
EW ZSCORE	**-0.86**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.93**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.88**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.98**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.91**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.88**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.98**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.91**
Median rank lineal	**-0.88**	**0.77**	**0.77**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.98**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.91**
Median rank total	**-0.87**	**0.87**	**0.87**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.90**	**0.93**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**0.91**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.40	-0.40	-0.36	-0.36	-0.36	-0.36	-0.61	-0.31	-0.35	-0.43	-0.51
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.40	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.07	0.52	0.36	0.56	0.57	**0.85**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.40	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	0.07	0.52	0.36	0.56	0.57	**0.85**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.36	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.00	0.44	0.24	0.49	0.47	**0.79**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.36	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.00	0.44	0.24	0.49	0.47	**0.79**
Median rank ordinal	-0.36	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.00	0.44	0.24	0.49	0.47	**0.79**
EW MIN MAX	-0.36	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	**1.00**	0.65	0.65	0.61	0.60	0.55
EW ZSCORE	-0.61	0.52	0.52	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.65	**1.00**	0.62	**0.85**	**0.88**	**0.84**
PCA MINMAX	-0.31	0.36	0.36	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.65	0.62	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.88**	0.64
PCA ZSCORE	-0.35	0.56	0.56	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.61	**0.85**	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.82**
Median rank lineal	-0.43	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.60	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**0.83**
Median rank total	-0.51	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.79**	0.55	**0.84**	0.64	**0.82**	**0.83**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.27	-0.27	-0.20	-0.20	-0.20	-0.34	-0.56	-0.30	-0.32	-0.38	-0.39
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.06	0.43	0.28	0.44	0.46	**0.78**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.27	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.96**	0.06	0.43	0.28	0.44	0.46	**0.78**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.20	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.00	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.34	**0.69**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.20	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.00	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.34	**0.69**
Median rank ordinal	-0.20	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**1.00**	0.00	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.34	**0.69**
EW MIN MAX	-0.34	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	**1.00**	0.63	0.63	0.59	0.57	0.48
EW ZSCORE	-0.56	0.43	0.43	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.63	**1.00**	0.60	**0.84**	**0.85**	**0.76**
PCA MINMAX	-0.30	0.28	0.28	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.63	0.60	**1.00**	**0.84**	**0.85**	0.57
PCA ZSCORE	-0.32	0.44	0.44	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.59	**0.84**	**0.84**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.74**
Median rank lineal	-0.38	0.46	0.46	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.57	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**0.74**
Median rank total	-0.39	**0.78**	**0.78**	**0.69**	**0.69**	**0.69**	0.48	**0.76**	0.57	**0.74**	**0.74**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Table 50A. Spearman (left) and Kendall (right) correlation between dissatisfaction with national democracy and ESI: Finland

Finland
1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.59**	**-0.59**	**-0.68**	**-0.68**	**-0.62**	-0.42	-0.21	**-0.51**	**-0.50**	**-0.50**	**-0.60**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.59**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	0.03	0.30	0.23	**0.60**	0.35	**0.94**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.59**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	0.03	0.30	0.23	**0.60**	0.35	**0.94**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.68**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	0.09	0.33	0.30	**0.64**	0.41	**0.95**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.68**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	0.09	0.33	0.30	**0.64**	0.41	**0.95**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.62**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.00**	0.05	0.31	0.24	**0.61**	0.36	**0.94**
EW MIN MAX	-0.42	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.09	0.05	**1.00**	**0.55**	**0.62**	0.34	**0.74**	0.18
EW ZSCORE	-0.21	0.30	0.30	0.33	0.33	0.31	**0.55**	**1.00**	0.24	**0.82**	**0.88**	**0.55**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.51**	0.23	0.23	0.30	0.30	0.24	**0.62**	0.24	**1.00**	0.31	**0.57**	0.27
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.50**	**0.60**	**0.60**	**0.64**	**0.64**	**0.61**	0.34	**0.82**	0.31	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.80**
Median rank lineal	**-0.50**	0.35	0.35	0.41	0.41	0.36	**0.74**	**0.88**	**0.57**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**0.54**
Median rank total	**-0.60**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**0.94**	0.18	**0.55**	0.27	**0.80**	**0.54**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	**-0.46**	**-0.46**	**-0.53**	**-0.53**	**-0.48**	-0.38	-0.17	**-0.46**	**-0.43**	**-0.43**	**-0.46**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	**-0.46**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.98**	0.02	0.24	0.18	**0.50**	0.29	**0.82**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.46**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**0.98**	0.02	0.24	0.18	**0.50**	0.29	**0.82**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.53**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	0.07	0.27	0.25	**0.53**	0.31	**0.85**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.53**	**0.92**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.95**	0.07	0.27	0.25	**0.53**	0.31	**0.85**
Median rank ordinal	**-0.48**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.95**	**0.95**	**1.00**	0.03	0.24	0.19	**0.50**	0.28	**0.83**
EW MIN MAX	-0.38	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.03	**1.00**	**0.53**	**0.58**	0.30	**0.69**	0.15
EW ZSCORE	-0.17	0.24	0.24	0.27	0.27	0.24	**0.53**	**1.00**	0.24	**0.78**	**0.80**	**0.46**
PCA MINMAX	**-0.46**	0.18	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.19	**0.58**	0.24	**1.00**	0.30	**0.51**	0.22
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.43**	**0.50**	**0.50**	**0.53**	**0.53**	**0.50**	0.30	**0.78**	0.30	**1.00**	**0.71**	**0.69**
Median rank lineal	**-0.43**	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.28	**0.69**	**0.80**	**0.51**	**0.71**	**1.00**	**0.44**
Median rank total	**-0.46**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.85**	**0.85**	**0.83**	0.15	**0.46**	0.22	**0.69**	**0.44**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.23	-0.23	-0.38	-0.38	-0.28	-0.38	0.42	-0.46	0.08	-0.18	-0.07
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.23	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.98**	0.28	0.19	**0.73**	0.41	0.48	**0.83**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.23	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.96**	**0.96**	**0.98**	0.28	0.19	**0.73**	0.41	0.48	**0.83**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.38	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	0.27	-0.02	**0.81**	0.21	0.36	**0.75**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.38	**0.96**	**0.96**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.98**	0.27	-0.02	**0.81**	0.21	0.36	**0.75**
Median rank ordinal	-0.28	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**0.98**	**1.00**	0.27	0.11	**0.72**	0.30	0.41	**0.80**
EW MIN MAX	-0.38	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27	**1.00**	0.31	0.38	0.05	**0.76**	0.27
EW ZSCORE	0.42	0.19	0.19	-0.02	-0.02	0.11	0.31	**1.00**	-0.33	**0.74**	**0.74**	0.54
PCA MINMAX	-0.46	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.81**	**0.81**	**0.72**	0.38	-0.33	**1.00**	-0.09	0.16	0.48
PCA ZSCORE	0.08	0.41	0.41	0.21	0.21	0.30	0.05	**0.74**	-0.09	**1.00**	0.59	0.69
Median rank lineal	-0.18	0.48	0.48	0.36	0.36	0.41	**0.76**	**0.74**	0.16	0.59	**1.00**	0.60
Median rank total	-0.07	**0.83**	**0.83**	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.80**	0.27	0.54	0.48	0.69	0.60	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

1999-2007
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.23	-0.23	-0.30	-0.30	-0.24	-0.34	0.38	-0.37	0.07	-0.17	-0.06
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.23	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.94**	0.25	0.11	**0.68**	0.32	0.39	**0.71**
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.23	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.88**	**0.88**	**0.94**	0.25	0.11	**0.68**	0.32	0.39	**0.71**
PCA MINMAX ordinal	-0.30	**0.88**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	0.24	-0.03	**0.73**	0.17	0.22	**0.61**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	-0.30	**0.88**	**0.88**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.94**	0.24	-0.03	**0.73**	0.17	0.22	**0.61**
Median rank ordinal	-0.24	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**0.94**	**1.00**	0.24	0.03	**0.67**	0.23	0.28	**0.67**
EW MIN MAX	-0.34	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.24	**1.00**	0.29	0.34	0.05	**0.70**	0.24
EW ZSCORE	0.38	0.11	0.11	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.29	**1.00**	-0.27	**0.71**	**0.66**	0.45
PCA MINMAX	-0.37	**0.68**	**0.68**	**0.73**	**0.73**	**0.67**	0.34	-0.27	**1.00**	-0.07	0.10	0.43
PCA ZSCORE	0.07	0.32	0.32	0.17	0.17	0.23	0.05	**0.71**	-0.07	**1.00**	0.52	**0.63**
Median rank lineal	-0.17	0.39	0.39	0.22	0.22	0.28	**0.70**	**0.66**	0.10	0.52	**1.00**	0.46
Median rank total	-0.06	**0.71**	**0.71**	**0.61**	**0.61**	**0.67**	0.24	0.45	0.43	**0.63**	0.46	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Spearman):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.57	-0.57	**-0.83**	**-0.83**	-0.64	-0.66	-0.63	-0.67	**-0.73**	-0.67	**-0.77**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.57	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.99**	0.34	0.06	0.22	0.18	0.20	0.69
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.57	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**0.99**	0.34	0.06	0.22	0.18	0.20	0.69
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.83**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	0.56	0.35	0.47	0.46	0.45	**0.84**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.83**	**0.90**	**0.90**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.93**	0.56	0.35	0.47	0.46	0.45	**0.84**
Median rank ordinal	-0.64	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.93**	**0.93**	**1.00**	0.41	0.13	0.28	0.25	0.26	**0.74**
EW MIN MAX	-0.66	0.34	0.34	0.56	0.56	0.41	**1.00**	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.88**	**0.87**	**0.90**
EW ZSCORE	-0.63	0.06	0.06	0.35	0.35	0.13	**0.86**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.93**	**0.97**	0.70
PCA MINMAX	-0.67	0.22	0.22	0.47	0.47	0.28	**0.86**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.75**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.73**	0.18	0.18	0.46	0.46	0.25	**0.88**	**0.93**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**0.76**
Median rank lineal	-0.67	0.20	0.20	0.45	0.45	0.26	**0.87**	**0.97**	**1.00**	**0.95**	**1.00**	**0.76**
Median rank total	**-0.77**	0.69	0.69	**0.84**	**0.84**	**0.74**	**0.90**	0.70	**0.75**	**0.76**	**0.76**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

2008-2016
Correlation matrix (Kendall):

Variables	EB	EW MIN MAX ordinal	EW ZSCORE ordinal	PCA MINMAX ordinal	PCA ZSCORE ordinal	Median rank ordinal	EW MIN MAX	EW ZSCORE	PCA MINMAX	PCA ZSCORE	Median rank lineal	Median rank total
EB	**1.00**	-0.45	-0.45	**-0.71**	**-0.71**	-0.50	-0.61	-0.60	-0.65	**-0.73**	-0.64	**-0.63**
EW MIN MAX ordinal	-0.45	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.97**	0.29	0.04	0.17	0.14	0.14	0.54
EW ZSCORE ordinal	-0.45	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**0.97**	0.29	0.04	0.17	0.14	0.14	0.54
PCA MINMAX ordinal	**-0.71**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	0.50	0.32	0.44	0.40	0.40	**0.75**
PCA ZSCORE ordinal	**-0.71**	**0.79**	**0.79**	**1.00**	**1.00**	**0.82**	0.50	0.32	0.44	0.40	0.40	**0.75**
Median rank ordinal	-0.50	**0.97**	**0.97**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**1.00**	0.36	0.11	0.24	0.20	0.20	**0.58**
EW MIN MAX	-0.61	0.29	0.29	0.50	0.50	0.36	**1.00**	**0.85**	**0.82**	**0.82**	**0.84**	**0.81**
EW ZSCORE	-0.60	0.04	0.04	0.32	0.32	0.11	**0.85**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.88**	**0.94**	**0.62**
PCA MINMAX	-0.65	0.17	0.17	0.44	0.44	0.24	**0.82**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**0.92**	**0.98**	**0.66**
PCA ZSCORE	**-0.73**	0.14	0.14	0.40	0.40	0.20	**0.82**	**0.88**	**0.92**	**1.00**	**0.91**	**0.63**
Median rank lineal	-0.64	0.14	0.14	0.40	0.40	0.20	**0.84**	**0.94**	**0.98**	**0.91**	**1.00**	**0.68**
Median rank total	**-0.63**	0.54	0.54	**0.75**	**0.75**	**0.58**	**0.81**	**0.62**	**0.66**	**0.63**	**0.68**	**1.00**

Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0,05

Source tables 29A to 50A: Own elaboration with data of Annex 3 and the Eurobarometer (1999-2016).

Annex 5. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Country-by-country

Figure 2A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Belgium



Figure 3A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Germany



Figure 4A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Ireland



Figure 5A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Greece



Figure 6A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Spain



Figure 7A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: France

Figure 8A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Italy



Figure 9A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Netherlands



Figure 10A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Austria



Figure 11A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Portugal



Figure 12A. ESI and dissatisfaction with national democracy evolution: Finland



Source figures 2A-12A: Own elaboration with the data of Annex 3 and the Eurobarometer (1999-2016).

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